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Abstract
Mission-oriented organizations, such as nonpro￿t organizations and NGOs, rely critically
on volunteer recruitment to achieve their organizational goals. Besides serving as an outlet
of altruistic motives, volunteering often acts as a stepping-stone for a paid position in the
nonpro￿t sector. This paper provides an explanation for the fact that nonpro￿t employers are
uniquely able to attract such volunteers with social concerns and career aspirations and for the
related observation that nonpro￿ts ￿gure prominently in mission-related activities. Our theory is
predicated on that ￿by committing to not distributing pro￿ts ￿nonpro￿t incorporation relaxes
the incentive constraint that employers face when implicitly contracting with volunteers, without
relying on ex ante di⁄erences in workers￿preferences over the employer￿ s identity or inherent
asymmetries between nonpro￿t and for-pro￿t providers. The not-for-pro￿t commitment is shown
to be e⁄ective only in activities where producers, who can choose to be for-pro￿t or nonpro￿t,
care about the level or quality of the service being provided. Thus, in the equilibrium of the
model developed here nonpro￿t entry in sectors where missions play a de￿ning role and the
hiring of volunteers arise endogenously due to economic forces. This equilibrium outcome has
some desirable welfare properties.
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11 Introduction
Volunteering constitutes a considerably large and increasing share of the nonpro￿t sector￿ s con-
tribution to economic activity, in most advanced economies.1 Besides volunteering for altruistic
reasons ￿a desire to help others or contribute to an important cause ￿there is a widespread belief
that volunteering can be a source of professional development by providing work experience and a
chance to develop skills that strengthen employability. This is especially true for those pursuing
employment in the nonpro￿t sector where volunteering experience appears to be a prerequisite for
any type of career. This paper takes the altruistic motivations and the career concerns of volun-
teers as a point of departure2 and provides an explanation for the following salient patterns (1)
nonpro￿t organizations attract the overwhelming share of volunteers3 that meet this pro￿le and
(2) volunteer-hiring nonpro￿ts are concentrated in mission-oriented sectors, where the goods and
services produced can be conceived as having a public (or collective) good component4 ￿commonly
thought to lead to the market underproviding them ￿and which generate nonpecuniary bene￿ts to
those involved in their delivery. Education, healthcare, childcare, international aid, the arts, reli-
gious and philanthropic foundations, and the vast social services are examples of mission-oriented
￿elds.5 These contrast with most other activities, typically provided by pro￿t taking ￿rms, where
non-pecuniary motivations are less of a consideration.
The challenge we pose in this paper is to explain the above set of observations as an equi-
librium outcome without positing that workers motivated by concerns for social outcomes have
an exogenous disposition for working at nonpro￿t establishments or assuming that nonpro￿t and
for-pro￿t producers have respective ex ante advantages in the delivery of goods and services of dif-
1For example, in 1997 the value of volunteer work amounted to roughly one-quarter of the total value of labour
services provided to the nonpro￿t sector in Canada, while in the U.S. it reached one-third of total earnings in the sector.
The estimate for Canada is taken from the Satellite Account of Nonpro￿t Institutions and Volunteering of Statistics
Canada, which is available at http://www.statcan.ca/english/freepub/13-015-XIE/13-015-XIE2004000.htm. For the
U.S., see the New Nonpro￿t Almanac and Desk Reference, Table 1.7, pg 22-23.
2This is motivated by previous research that studied factors that determine the decision to supply volunteer time,
which found evidence suggesting that besides purely altruistic motives people may engage in volunteering activities to
improve their employment opportunities: Menchik and Weisbrod (1987), Day and Devlin (1998), Segal and Weisbrod
(2002), Gunderson and Gomez (2003). For instance, Day and Devlin (1998) report evidence of a 6-7 percent return of
volunteering in annual earnings for Canadian workers. Surveys also support these ￿ndings. For example, the National
Survey of Giving, Volunteering, and Participating (2000), which provides a snapshot of the state of voluntary and
civic action in Canada, reveals that almost a quarter (23%) of volunteers agreed that improving job opportunities
was a reason for volunteering, with younger volunteers more likely (55%) to indicate this as a reason. Furthermore,
14% of volunteers reported that volunteering had at some point helped them to obtain employment, with again a
greater proportion of younger volunteers (24%) claiming likewise. See Hall et al. (2001), ￿gure 2.2, pg 35.
3In 1998, the distribution of full-time volunteers by sector in the U.S. was 68.5 percent nonpro￿t, 26 percent
government and 5.5 percent for-pro￿t sector. See the New Nonpro￿t Almanac and Desk Reference, Figure 1.7, pg 24.
4Even though these goods do not necessarily feaure both properties shared by public goods ￿ nonrivalry and
nonexcludability ￿they are associated with external bene￿ts. For example, a person may bene￿t from high quality
healthcare coverage of others, not only because it reduces the chances that she may be infected by a contagious
disease, but also because of ethical concerns for the standards of human well-being in society.
5See Rose-Ackerman (1996) for cross-country documentation of the composition of the nonpro￿t sector.
2ferent character. We expound our theory by developing a model with two sectors (a mission sector
and a non-mission sector), where heterogeneous (some mission motivated and some not) managers
(principals) and workers (agents) are matched, choosing organizational form (for-pro￿t, nonpro￿t),
employment contract and sector. To address the previously mentioned challenge we start from a
position of ex-ante symmetry: (a) the intrinsic bene￿t that caring managers and workers derive in
the mission sector is attached to the job that they do, not the identity of the organization (non-
pro￿t or for-pro￿t) in which they do it;6 (b) workers are equally productive working for either type
of employer; and (c) managers have access to a common production technology regardless of the
organizational form they select. Therefore, besides the restriction in the appropriation of pro￿ts
there are no ex ante structural di⁄erences between for-pro￿t and nonpro￿t status. We then proceed
to demonstrate how the observed con￿guration (nonpro￿t ￿rms hiring volunteers in the mission
sector) arises endogenously in the equilibrium of the model, among the host of ex ante possible
(￿rm-type/employment structure/sector) combinations, and that this particular equilibrium has
some desirable welfare properties.
An important feature of the analysis is that workers￿e⁄ort and output are unveri￿able by third
parties and as a result performance-contingent remuneration is infeasible;7 this element is present
in both sectors and for all types of ￿rm. One standard solution to this incentive problem is the
use of implicit contracts that are self-enforcing and that take advantage of the long-term aspect of
the employment relationship: a worker receives a ￿xed payment that exceeds opportunity costs as
long as performance has been satisfactory and is dismissed otherwise.8 This type of compensation,
namely a wage set above the market clearing rate (e¢ ciency wage), is known to induce important
labor market ine¢ ciencies ￿sub-optimal employment levels. Here, motivated by the observation
that some workers (interns and volunteers) are induced to undertake unpaid or very low pay work by
the possibility of rewards in the form of future employment by the same or some other employer, we
recognize that this two-tier employment structure provides a more e¢ cient solution to the problem
of incomplete employment contracts: it allows ￿rms to extract some of the rents that workers have
to be o⁄ered later on as paid workers in order to supply e⁄ort, thus dampening the distorting e⁄ect
arising from providing incentives with payments above opportunity cost.9
We consider two alternative incentive structures, which in the interest of facilitating exposition
we refer to as:
6This is not to deny that individuals might receive direct bene￿ts from founding or working for a nonpro￿t ￿rm.
Here we wish to explore whether we can explain the observed patterns of nonpro￿t activity without assuming such
direct rewards.
7The notion that workers￿performance is observed by the ￿rm but cannot be veri￿ed in court is borrowed from
the incomplete contracts literature and has been widely applied to agency models of employment, see Malcomson
(1999).
8In the context of the provision of public services, this avenue has been pursued in Francois (2003).
9The possibility that employers use deferred payments as a means of providing incentives has been studied, in a
di⁄erent context, by Lazear (1981) and by Akerlof and Katz (1989).
3￿Volunteering: A worker is hired as an unpaid volunteer and is subsequently transferred to a paid
position not necessarily at the ￿rm where he has volunteered (incentives are sector-wide).
￿Internship: A worker is hired as an unpaid intern and is subsequently promoted within the ￿rm
he has interned, when a vacancy is created (incentives are ￿rm-speci￿c).
The key di⁄erence between volunteering and internship is that time spent volunteering elsewhere
is regularly treated ￿as if￿it were volunteered at the ￿rm ￿much like actual volunteering occurs in
reality ￿whereas interns are promoted at the ￿rm where they intern. In both structures a worker is
willing to work for a period with no pay if he anticipates that he will be subsequently promoted to a
wage position, yielding an expected lifetime utility no less than his outside option. But notice that
the hiring of volunteers (or interns) introduces a two-sided moral hazard problem, as ￿rms have
incentive to recruit unpaid workers, promising them promotion to paid positions, and then renege
on the promise. It is well known from the theory of repeated games that repeated interaction
can help overcome these problems (reputation mechanism), if the discounted stream of payo⁄s
associated with hiring volunteers exceeds the payo⁄s from cheating and then being punished by
having to resort to hiring only paid workers. The dynamic interaction between multiple ￿rms and
workers is formally studied as a repeated game and a characterization of the equilibrium strategies
supporting ￿ volunteering￿and the ￿ internship￿structure is provided.
An additional component of the present setting is that managers and workers can be intrinsically
motivated and derive nonpecuniary bene￿ts from contributing to the production of mission goods
(e.g. nurses, teachers, aid workers). Motivated agents are typically heterogeneous in terms of
mission preferences ￿what activity to pursue and how to pursue it ￿and usually some hands-on
experience is required before an individual can learn enough about the di⁄erent causes to be able
to identify a preferred mission. For example, the manager of an international aid agency or an
aid worker may prefer working for an organization with a particular religious outlook, or they may
develop through experience a preference over the targeted group of bene￿ciaries (which group is
more needy). Because the main parties involved may have di⁄erent views about how the project
should be carried out, preference alignment is an important determinant of the quality of the mission
good.10 Volunteering facilitates the matching of like-minded organizations and workers, which
improves the quality/impact of the mission activity as well-matched pairs are more productive: a
volunteer works for a period of ￿ exploration￿ , then as his mission preferences become known he can
transfer to a matching ￿rm, when a vacancy is created. By contrast, internships match workers
10The role of matching in principal-agent pairs with heterogeneous preferences is explored in Besley and Ghatak
(2005), who show that better matching leads to higher e⁄ort and productivity. Here we take as given the proposition
that better matched pairs are more productive in order to focus on how the interaction between the choice of
organizational form (for pro￿t or nonpro￿t) and incentive structure (volunteering or internship) can lead to more
e¢ cient matching.
4and organizations randomly, as when an intern joins the ￿rm his mission preferences have not been
determined. Therefore, from employers￿perspective volunteer hiring is the preferred hiring practice
in the mission sector because it can generate more e¢ cient matching.
The workings of the matching process we envisage between mission-motivated principals and
agents resemble that of the entry-level medical labour market. There it was recognized that mis-
matches occurred because competition led hospitals to sign up interns early on, years ahead of
graduation, before their skills and interests were developed. The problem was that when a hospital
and an intern reached an early deal they did not take into account the externality imposed on
other hospitals and interns (Roth 1984). Some rules were eventually designed to move the dates
of appointment later into the senior year of medical school when more information about students￿
abilities and preferences was available and as a result more e¢ cient matches between interns and
hospitals were identi￿ed. We believe that the process of volunteer hiring we described above alle-
viates a similar problem ￿albeit in a less structured fashion than the labour market for medical
residents ￿that would arise if mission-oriented organizations hired workers too soon (as would be
the case with internships), before their mission preferences have been revealed.
Nothing in the structure of the model we have sketched suggests that a rational manager would
choose nonpro￿t over for-pro￿t status, since the only e⁄ect of this choice is that the manager￿ s
pecuniary payo⁄ from operating the ￿rm is reduced. A possible reason would be that nonpro￿ts
are at an advantage in terms of being able to sustain volunteer hiring. But does the nonpro￿t
incorporation relax the incentive compatibility constraint that makes commitment to hiring vol-
unteers credible? Our analysis suggests that the answer to this hinges on the type of activity
(mission-oriented or not) that is undertaken. In particular, if volunteering only raises pro￿ts then
it does not have a particular advantage over for-pro￿t ￿rms (true in the non-mission sector). This
is because while for a nonpro￿t ￿rm the bene￿t from cheating is weaker ￿under nonpro￿t status
pro￿ts are less valuable for managers because they can only be enjoyed as perks ￿so is the reward
for honest behavior. Therefore, in this case a nonpro￿t manager￿ s promise of honest behavior is
not more credible than the one of a for-pro￿t manager. On the other hand, if volunteering also
enhances the quality of the service provided ￿because of better matching ￿and managers care
about quality, then nonpro￿t status is helpful in solving employers￿moral hazard problem (true in
the mission sector). The intuition is that a nonpro￿t manager will discount more heavily the fact
that if she cheats on volunteers quality will su⁄er and hence a smaller pro￿t (reputational rent) is
needed to maintain incentive compatibility. With free-entry the incentive compatibility constraint
for nonpro￿t ￿rms binds, which means that the one for for-pro￿t ￿rms fails, so they cannot use the
volunteer hiring strucuture.
Thus, the model accounts for the observed patterns of entry by sector: nonpro￿ts engage
5in the provision of goods and services where better matching on mission preferences improves
quality, while in sectors where missions play no role, nonpro￿t incorporation is not essential and
for-pro￿t status will be preferred. In addition, our analysis explains why otherwise similar nonpro￿t
and for-pro￿t organizations will select di⁄erent incentive structures to motivate their workers.
In equilibrium, nonpro￿t organizations select on the volunteering organizational structure while
for-pro￿t organizations utilize the internship. These features are in tune with the patterns of
employment structure, work force characteristics, and ￿rm-type entry across sectors that we observe
in many modern economies. Finally, we show that this equilibrium has some desirable welfare
properties as it generates more employment and output than a benchmark equilibrium where only
paid workers are employed, or one where ￿rms hire interns.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next subsection brie￿ y discusses strands
of the literature that are relevant for this paper. Section 2 introduces the environment of the
model, characterizes the two types of relational employment contract for an exogenously matched
organization-worker pair, and analyzes the choice of organizational form and employment relational
contract in each sector. Section 3 turns to market equilibrium, characterizing a steady-state ￿ sorting￿
equilibrium in the two sectors and presents a welfare analysis of the equilibrium. Section 4 contains
a brief discussion of some anecdotal accounts and case studies that lend support to some of the
arguments made in this paper and Section 5 concludes.
Related Literature
This paper is related to the literature that has identi￿ed circumstances where nonpro￿t status
may be a valuable commitment against opportunistic behavior that arises because of various forms
of contractual incompleteness. For instance, Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) argue that nonpro￿t
incorporation is a valuable mechanism for an entrepreneur because, by weakening incentives to
maximize pro￿ts, it credibly commits to customers that non-contractible quality will be higher,
while in Rowat and Seabright (2006), nonpro￿t status is a valuable signal for aid agencies because
it reassures donors that their funds will be indeed directed to unveri￿able development projects and
not be skimmed o⁄. Francois (2001) establishes conditions under which a nonpro￿t entrepreneur, by
relinquishing residual claims to pro￿ts, faces weaker incentives to adjust production after a worker
has shirked. When workers care about the level of the public good produced, this commitment
is shown to be valuable in that it reduces the wage that has to be o⁄ered to induce worker￿ s
non-contractible e⁄ort.
This paper is also related to a literature (Weisbrod (1988), Tirole (1994), Rose-Ackerman (1996),
Francois (2000, 2001, 2003), Dixit (2002)) which emphasizes the notion that organizations produc-
ing public goods and services pursue missions that depart from strict pro￿t-maximization, and
6underlines the signi￿cance of the fact that workers in these sectors are intrinsically motivated by
the action of participating in the provision of these collective goods. Several recent papers study the
provision of incentives and the screening of intrinsically motivated workers, among others (Handy
and Katz (1998), Murdock (2002), Francois (2006), Delfgaauw and Dur (2006)). Our paper builds
on the contributions by Besley and Ghatak (2005, 2006a), who study incentive design issues in an
environment with mission-motivated principals and agents. Their emphasis is on the role of match-
ing of principals and agents on mission preferences and the e⁄ects of competition on productivity
and the power of incentives, but they abstract from issues concerning organizational form which
are central in our model. Speci￿cally, the contribution of the present paper is that it presents
a plausible avenue (volunteer hiring and sorting) which interacting with the endogenously chosen
organizational status allows mission-driven entrepreneurs to match with like-minded workers and
therefore play the e¢ ciency enhancing role emphasized by Besley and Ghatak (2005). Also, one
of our aims (and indeed the one that might be relevant for policy-makers) is to compare welfare
outcomes between an equilibrium where the volunteering structure is sustained, and hence the
matching is facilitated, to one where it fails.
2 The Model
2.1 Primitives
We consider an economy with discrete time and in￿nite time horizon consisting of two sectors: a
mission-oriented and a non-mission-oriented sector which serves as a benchmark, denoted by m and
b respectively. Two groups of agents exist in the economy: managers/entrepreneurs and workers.11
Agents remain alive for another period with probability ￿ 2 (0;1), while with the complementary
probability, (1 ￿ ￿); they die and are replaced by identical agents.12 There is heterogeneity in
mission preferences in both groups. Speci￿cally, we consider three types of workers, indexed by i;
and managers, indexed by j; with i; j 2 fu; m1; m2g: Type u managers and workers are motivated
exclusively by monetary rewards. We refer to type u agents as unmotivated. Types m1 and m2 are
referred to as mission-motivated in light of the fact that, besides the usual pecuniary motivations,
they are driven by a concern about the missions pursued by the organizations they join. We
allow for a distinction between m1and m2 which has one of two possible interpretations. It can
either re￿ ect the di⁄erences in focus among the variety of sub￿elds of public good activity (e.g.
advocacy/activist versus direct care provider), or it can re￿ ect di⁄erences in some attribute (e.g.
religious a¢ liation versus secular) within some speci￿c sub￿eld (e.g. education) of the mission
11For clarity, we shall refer to managers using feminine pronouns and to workers using masculine.
12For convenience, we subsume the discounting factor of agents in ￿:
7sector.
We assume that the supply of managers is in￿nitely elastic. A measure Lu of unmotivated
workers and a measure Lm of mission-motivated workers are alive every period, half of which are of
type m1 and half of type m2; that is (Lm1 = Lm2 = Lm
2 ). The fraction ￿ of workers that dies every
period is immediately replaced by identical workers, who enter the labour market as unemployed,
so that the size and the composition of the workforce remain intact and stationary.
There are three goods in the model: two produced goods gm and gb; corresponding to the mission
and the non-mission sector respectively, and a non-produced numeraire good y. Production of gm
and gb is undertaken by organizations ￿established as either for-pro￿t or nonpro￿t ￿which consist
of a manager (founder) employing two workers. Details about the di⁄erences between the two types
of institutions are provided further on. Workers do not care directly about the type of organization
they work for and are equally productive working for either type of provider. All organizations
in each sector, have access to a common sector-speci￿c production technology, gs(e1;e2); where
s 2 fm; bg and ei 2 fel;ehg, which describes how the combined e⁄ort choices of the two workers
and the entrepreneurial input of the manager translate into the production of the organization￿ s
service, gm or gb.13 We assume that each worker can choose between two e⁄ort levels: high e⁄ort
(e = eh) with corresponding output gs(eh
1;eh
2) = gh
s, and low e⁄ort (e = el = 0) which yields a
normalized output gs(el
1;el
2) = 0. When only one of the workers shirks production level falls but
not all the way to zero: gs(eh
1;el
2) = gs(el
1;eh
2) = ￿; where 0 < ￿ < gh
s: Workers￿e⁄ort, e; need
not admit a one-dimensional interpretation; one can imagine that workers￿e⁄ort is applied along a
vector of qualitative and/or quantitative dimensions of output that managers care about.
In the mission sector, if, in addition to high e⁄ort, workers￿ type matches the type of the
organization we assume that preference congruence has a bene￿cial impact on productivity. When
workers￿are called to carry out a mission with which they identify, they are more motivated, and
hence provision of gm is increased to b gm > gh
m.14 To be concrete, we imagine that that there
are two sets of actions that workers can take: one set is costly to them to provide, and shirking
on this dimension will eventually be detected by the manager of the organization. These actions,
denoted by (e) in the model, are responsible for the organization delivering gh
m when e⁄ort is high.
In addition, there is another unobservable set of actions, not explicitly modeled, that workers will
only undertake if they buy into the mission of the organization. It is this set of actions that we
view as accounting for the higher level of mission good provision, b gm, that the organization can
13For simplicity, we abstract from non-labour inputs. One possible interpretation of the di⁄erence between a man-
ager and a worker is that performing the entrepreneurial and supervisory duties of a manager requires an investment
in human capital. Thus, a wealthy fraction of workers who have incurred the ￿xed cost of acquiring the human capital
have become managers. We do not model this investment decision here.
14In reality, the di⁄erence between g
H
m and b gm would most likely correspond to di⁄erences in the quality of the
service being produced. Our model is consistent with this view, if we interpret output as being weighted by quality.
8achieve with better matching.15
In order to focus on incentive issues we assume that workers are risk neutral and have a within
period utility function, separable in income (y) and e⁄ort (e). We summarize the per-period utility,
UW
ij (y;￿ij;e), attained by worker of type i when working for employer of type j as follows:
UW
ij (y;￿ij;e) =
8
> > <
> > :
y ￿ e if i = u and j = u
y + ￿l ￿ e if i 2 fm1;m2g; j 2 fm1;m2g; i 6= j
y + ￿h ￿ e if i 2 fm1;m2g; j 2 fm1;m2g; i = j
where ￿h > ￿l > 0 (1)
The parameter ￿ij represents the intrinsic payo⁄of a mission-motivated worker, which accrues to the
worker independently of the legal status of the organization (for-pro￿t or nonpro￿t).16 If employed
by one of the organizations, a worker receives an endogenous wage w, while if not employed workers
are able to ￿nd work elsewhere at an exogenously given reservation wage
￿
w; which does not require
high e⁄ort.17 To rule out trivial outcomes, we assume that psgs(eh
1;eh
2)￿2eh > 2
￿
w; where ps is the
market price for good gs, so it is productively e¢ cient for workers to be employed by a ￿rm and to
choose high e⁄ort.
Unmotivated managers, type u, care only about personal consumption of the numeraire good
y. On the other hand, mission-motivated managers have preferences given by uM
j (y;gm); for j 2
fm1;m2g. That is, we allow mission-motivated managers, as we did above with mission-motivated
workers, to derive personal nonpecuniary bene￿ts from being involved in the delivery of collective
goods. Note, however, that managers￿altruistic motivations are outcome-oriented as they care
about the scale of the mission good (gm) produced by the organization they set up and not merely
about their participation in the production of the collective good. As in the case of workers, intrinsic
motivations are present whether the manager sets up a nonpro￿t or a for-pro￿t organization. We
identify the mission of the organization with the manager￿ s type. Furthermore, we assume that the
manager￿ s type and the organization￿ s form are common knowledge and so is the worker￿ s type ￿
whether he is mission-motivated or not; however, if he is, his precise mission type (m1 or m2) is
revealed to him and becomes public information only after working for one period.
Before entering a sector, a manager can choose whether to establish the organization as for-
15Our logic is similar to that in Akerlof and Kranton (2005), who emphasize the notion of workers￿identity and
argue that when workers identify with the goals of the organizations they are employed they might be willing to
put in high e⁄ort with little wage variation. Here we take the view that workers￿sense of identity stems from the
particular mission the organization is committed to.
16The way we speci￿ed preferences implies that workers receive a ￿warm glow￿ e⁄ect; that is, the bene￿t they
receive is action-determined not output-determined, as in Besley and Ghatak (2005). If instead we allowed workers
to be motivated by the e⁄ects of their actions on the quantity of output, then the bene￿t generated would entail
a public good component and hence a standard free-riding problem would ensue. The implications of this type of
preferences on organizational incentives are pursued in Francois (2003, 2006).
17Alternatively,
￿
w may be thought of as the value of home production.
9pro￿t or nonpro￿t. Thus, a brief description of the di⁄erences between the two organizational forms
is in order. The objective of the manager (residual claimant) of a private enterprise is primarily
to maximize pro￿ts (￿) for the organization. This assumption is standard in neoclassical economic
analysis and does not warrant further justi￿cation. On the other hand, when an organization is
nonpro￿t, it is not obvious what the objective of its manager is. Nevertheless, a de￿ning charac-
teristic of nonpro￿ts is that they are subject to a nondistribution constraint, which stipulates that
the manager of a nonpro￿t is banned from appropriating any net earnings from the organization￿ s
operations.18 We follow Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) in assuming that the e⁄ect of this is that a
fraction of the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts can indirectly accrue to her in the form of perquisites such as less work
hours, better working conditions etc.19 This way of modelling the objectives of nonpro￿t managers
makes operational the notion that these organizations can be instituted to have weaker incentives
to pursue pro￿ts.20 Though it is true that for-pro￿t ￿rms may also be motivated to serve other
goals, we maintain that they must be consistent with their primary responsibility which is to gen-
erate su¢ cient rewards to shareholders.21 Thus, we take the view that, as a ￿rst approximation,
for-pro￿t managers will face more high-powered incentives to maximize total ￿rm value than their
nonpro￿t counterparts.
In keeping with this discussion, we assume that the decision making process within nonpro￿t
organizations ￿represented by the actions of the manager (founder) in our analysis ￿balances
the goals of maximizing pro￿ts and furthering the mission of the organization. We posit that
the outcome of this can be represented by an induced per-period quasi-linear utility function for a
manager of type j who chooses organizational form k; where k = f denotes a for-pro￿t organization
and k = n indicates a nonpro￿t organization, given by:
vk
j(￿;gs) = ￿k
j￿ + ￿jsb(gs) (2)
where ￿ stands for pro￿ts and b(:) is a strictly increasing and concave function. The binary variable
￿js 2 f0;1g captures managers￿￿care intensity￿ or altruism, which is only present for mission-
motivated managers when producing a mission-oriented good (i:e: ￿jm = 1 for j 2 fm1;m2g,
while ￿jb = 0 for j 2 fu;m1;m2g). The parameter ￿k
j 2 [0;1] re￿ ects the extent to which the
18It is important to note that such a constraint does not preclude the possibility that a nonpro￿t organization may
be actually earning positive pro￿ts.
19In addition to the nondistribution constraint, nonpro￿t organizations do not have access to the equity capital
market and may be also subject to regulations requiring that they engage in speci￿c charitable, religious, educational
or scienti￿c activities in order to receive preferential tax treatment. We abstract from these issues here.
20It is beyond the scope of this paper to model explicitly the objectives and constraints of nonpro￿t managers. The
approach taken here serves the purpose of focusing attention on whether volunteer hiring can be consistent with a
￿rm objective that departs from strict pro￿t-maximization.
21In a recent paper, Besley and Ghatak (2006b) show that the pursuit of socially responsible practices by pro￿t-
maximizing ￿rms is possible in a competitive environment. They develop a model in which some ￿rms commit to
producing a public good along with a private good and are able to ￿nance its production by charging caring consumers
a premium for the private good. These ￿rms can be viewed as exercising corporate socially responsibility (CSR).
10organization￿ s pro￿ts can be enjoyed as income by the manager ￿so the nondistribution constraint
implies that ￿
f
j > ￿n
j . We assume that di⁄erences in mission preferences (m1 or m2) are orthogonal
to the degree to which the nondistribution constraint is enforced, and that a for-pro￿t manager is
the sole residual claimant, thus all pro￿ts ￿ accrue to her.22 From now on we let ￿n
m1 = ￿n
m2 ￿ ￿n;
and ￿
f
m1 = ￿
f
m2 = ￿
f
u ￿ 1.
Note that when production is of the good without the mission component gb, then ￿jb = 0, so
setting up a nonpro￿t ￿rm in the non-mission sector only corresponds with reducing the utility a
manager obtains from pro￿t. Equation (2) captures, in a reduced-form, the fundamental trade-o⁄
that the manager faces in making the incorporating decision, highlighted by Glaeser and Shleifer
(2001): commitment to nonpro￿t status signals greater care for the ￿ quality￿of the public good,
which, however, comes at the cost of restricted access to pecuniary rewards.
An important feature of the environment in which production is undertaken is that though the
individual performance of the worker can be potentially assessed by the manager or supervisor,
it is unveri￿able by third parties, and as a result, no standard contractual instruments can be
used to induce workers￿e⁄ort. For example, an aid worker￿ s job description typically involves a
variety of complex tasks: from direct care provision to drafting reports, fund-raising and lobbying.
Performance related compensation in this context is rare because (a) The monitoring and mea-
surement of a worker￿ s contribution to these tasks is very costly (and certainly di¢ cult to verify
by a third party, such as the courts) or (b) it may be di¢ cult to ascertain an individual worker￿ s
contribution (due to the team character of production) or (c) it may induce e⁄ort distortions (due
to multi-tasking considerations).23 We abstract from the underlying details regarding the incentive
provision problem and simply assume that workers￿input and the intrinsic reward they receive,
though potentially observable by the ￿rm and the agent, are noncontractible. At the heart of the
problem is not asymmetric information between principal and agent but third party nonveri￿ability
of the individual worker￿ s e⁄ort and output.
When an employer and a worker are engaged in a repeated, on-going relationship, they may be
able to sustain informal long-term relational contracts as a means to overcome the noncontractibility
of worker￿ s performance. Speci￿cally, MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) (under symmetric informa-
tion) and Levin (2003) (under adverse selection and moral hazard) have shown, in a repeated game
framework, the existence of an equilibrium outcome where ￿rms can use implicit self-enforcing con-
tracts to motivate workers, provided there is su¢ cient rent for both parties from the continuation of
employment. Optimal self-enforcing contracts can take the form of e¢ ciency wages or performance
bonuses depending on market conditions.24 We proceed to characterize ￿rst, the nature of the in-
22For simplicity, we make no distinction between the owner and the manager of the ￿rm, so that agency problems
between ownership and control are assumed away.
23This insight is emphasized in the multi-tasking literature, see for example Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991).
24In particular, MacLeod and Malcomson (1998) have shown that e¢ ciency wages are likely to arise in markets
11ternship and volunteering relational contract between an exogenously given single manager-worker
pair, and, subsequently, the market equilibrium in section 3.
2.2 The Employment Relational Contracts
The two alternative relational contracts that we consider here are (a) The internship contract, which
entails the vertical promotion of interns within an organization. Under this incentive structure,
workers and managers are randomly matched. (b) The volunteering contract, which involves the
horizontal sorting of workers to managers with similar mission preferences, after the unpaid stage.
In the mission sector, this incentive structure will be shown to generate assortative matching of
organization-worker pairs. Both sorts of self-enforcing contracts give rise to actions that could not
be supported in a one-shot interaction, but which can be sustained when agents have a su¢ ciently
high valuation of the future.
In the present model, a worker faces the following career choices: what sector to seek employment
(m or b), what type of employer (u; m1; m2) to be matched with and how much e⁄ort to exert
(eh or el). To ￿x ideas, we describe brie￿ y the successive stages in the career path of a typical
worker who will enter into an implicit contract with a manager in a certain sector, assuming that
such contracts exist in equilibirum, abstracting momentarily from issues of sector selection and
matching which are considered subsequently. The given worker moves sequentially through three
states: the general pool of workers, unpaid employment and paid employment (i.e. deferred wage
position). In particular, the worker is born into the general pool where he receives an exogenous
compensation
￿
w every period. At the end of each period there is an endogenous probability ￿ that
the worker will exit the general pool and will ￿nd an unpaid employment position. Suppose that
this occurs in period t￿1; then the worker works for no pay during period t and at the end of the
period he transitions to a wage position with probability (1 ￿ ￿); otherwise, he remains an unpaid
worker for another period.25 If the worker is hired into a paid position he continues to work there
until he dies.
We model the self-enforcing contracts as equilibrium strategies of a dynamic game between
managers and workers. The ￿rst step of the analysis is to specify precisely the incomplete contract
environment in which the repeated game is conducted.
where there is excess supply of workers, while performance-related bonus payments in markets with excess demand
for workers.
25At this point the employer must decide whether to honour the promise to promote the worker or cheat by hiring
another intern to ￿ll the vacancy. We examine the conditions that ensure employers￿incentive compatible behavior
in the next section.
122.2.1 Information Structure and Within Period Timing
Our speci￿cation of the information structure of the repeated game between workers and organi-
zations, at any time t, can be summarized as follows:26
Public Information. The identity of all previous employment pairs and the wage payment
histories are common knowledge since they are veri￿able pieces of information. In particular, all
workers and managers know whether a separation has occurred but do not know whether the
worker quit or was ￿red, since this information is unveri￿able. A separation that has taken place
because of a death of one of the parties is distinguishable from separations due to the other causes
involving one of the parties violating a promise. Also, if a separation occurs because a volunteer
transfers to a paid position with a di⁄erent employer this is also distinguishable from a separation
due to malfeasance.27 Note that a manager￿ s public history includes the event of mistreatment of
volunteers. By this we refer to the event where an organization which has been hiring volunteers
into unpaid positions refuses to reciprocate by promoting workers from the volunteering pool into
its own paid work vacancies. We assume that such practice becomes public information.28
Worker￿ s Private Information. A worker knows his own performance and whether the organi-
zation where he was employed in previous periods honoured any promises made to him.
Manager￿ s Private Information. A manager knows the history of e⁄ort conributions of all her
workers up to time t and whether she has delivered on promises made to her workers.
The sequencing of decisions within a period in the contracting game between a matched manager
and worker is:
￿ The manager makes the hiring decision (if there is a vacancy).
￿ The manager decides whether to make a payment or not.
￿ The worker makes the e⁄ort decision.
￿ The manager observes imperfectly worker￿ s e⁄ort contribution.
26For a similar treatment of the information structure in a dynamic game between workers and ￿rms, see MacLeod
and Malcomson (1989).
27For example, a letter of con￿rmation/recommendation from the employer outlining a volunteer￿ s experience may
be provided at the end of the assignment.
28When an organization cheets on the promise to promote a volunteer into its paid position, it hires instead an
unpaid intern directly from the general pool and therefore ceases to employ a paid worker. We assume that this
practice can be detected by labour market participants by observing the composition of the organization￿ s workforce.
Essentially what we assume is that whether the organization is employing paid workers or not is public information,
which is veri￿able information since wage payments are veri￿abel.
13￿ The worker observes manager￿ s hiring decision.
￿ Both parties decide whether to continue the employment relationship or not.
￿ The period ends and both players continues to the next period with probability ￿.
Period Starts Period Ends
Manager makes
promotion decision
 (if any)
Worker observes
Manager's promotion
decision
Manager and Worker
make separation
decisions
Worker chooses
effort
Manager makes
payment (if any)
Manager observes
(imperfectly) worker's
effort
Figure 1: Timing of Events
2.2.2 The ￿ Internship￿Incentive Compatible Wage
We now focus on the determination of the incentive compatible wage that induces an intern￿ s e⁄ort.
We consider a stationary environment, with employers o⁄ering the same wage wI every period and
the expected utility a worker gains from remaining in the general pool being constant. Letting
V I
ijt represent the expected lifetime utility of a worker of type i who accepts an unpaid position
(internship) at an organization of type j at time t, and suppressing the time subscripts we write:
V I
ij = ￿eh + ￿
h
(1 ￿ ￿)V
p
ij + ￿V I
ij
i
(3)
In this expression, (1 ￿ ￿) denotes the probability that there will be a paid position vacancy and
thus that the intern will be hired into a paid job. V
p
ij designates the expected lifetime utility of a
paid worker who decides to deliver high e⁄ort. An intern receives no compensation and provides
high e⁄ort in the current period but expects to be hired into a paid job with probability (1 ￿ ￿).
Thus, (1 ￿ ￿) acts as a quasi-discount factor on the value of becoming a paid worker.
Similarly, V
p
ij is de￿ned below:
V
p
ij = wI + ￿ij ￿ eh + ￿ max(V
p
ij;V s
ij) (4)
where V s
ij represents the expected utility of a worker who decides to shirk. If a worker supplies high
e⁄ort then he attains utility wI + ￿ij ￿ eh during the course of the current period, where wI is the
wage associated with the position in an organization of type j and ￿ij is the intrinsic reward for
14individual of type i associated with a position in an organization of type j. If the job is continued,
then the worker decides whether to furnish high e⁄ort next period or not, if doing so yields greater
utility to him than shirking.
When a worker shirks, he receives the wage wI and the nonpecuniary bene￿t ￿ij but does not
undergo the disutility of supplying e⁄ort. A shirking worker is detected with a constant exogenous
probability ￿ 2 (0;1); in which case he loses the job at the end of the period, and goes undetected
with probability (1 ￿ ￿) in which case he makes the e⁄ort decision again next period.29 We write
the value function of a shirker as:
V s
ij = wI + ￿ij + ￿
h
￿V g + (1 ￿ ￿)max(V
p
ij;V s
ij)
i
(5)
Finally, the value function of being in the outside general pool is:
V g =
￿
w + ￿
￿
￿V I
ij + (1 ￿ ￿)V g￿
(6)
where
￿
w is the general pool compensation and ￿ is the endogenous, in equilibrium, job acquisition
rate.
Let us now consider the incentives that employers face in designing the relational contract.
Their strategy is to minimize labour costs subject to being able to attract interns and induce
them to provide high e⁄ort. Consequently, they will choose wI such that the prospective worker
is no worse-o⁄ from becoming an intern and not remaining in the general pool, i.e. the following
participation constraint must be satis￿ed:
V I
ij ￿ V g (PC)
If V I
ij > V g, then it is in the ￿rm￿ s best interest to adjust the features of the package and transfer
the surplus from the worker to itself such that internships are no more attractive than the outside
option. The only means of adjusting the package, since the probability of transitioning from unpaid
to paid work (1 ￿ ￿) is exogenous, is to reduce the wage associated with a paid position. Let the
wage solving (PC) with equality be wPC: Substituting from (3); (6) and (4) it can be shown that:
wPC =
1 + ￿
￿
(eh +
￿
w) ￿ ￿r (7)
where ￿r is the expected intrinsic payo⁄when workers and ￿rms are randomly matched. (￿l < ￿r <
29The assumption of a less than perfect monitoring technology can be justi￿ed by the costs associated with super-
vision. In addition, we assume that inference of e⁄ort via observing output is impossible because of noise and the
di¢ culties of identifying individual contributions due to the team character of production.
15￿h): Also, to deter shirking by the worker, the wage o⁄ered to the worker must satisfy the following
incentive compatibility (no-shirking) constraint:
V
p
ij ￿ V s
ij (8)
this condition implies:
Lemma 1 If the probability of detection of a shirking worker is su¢ ciently low, ￿ <
(1￿￿)eh
￿
w+eh , then
the relational contract (wI;eh) between an intern/worker and a ￿rm consists of a wage satisfying:
wI(￿) =
￿
1 ￿ ￿2￿
(1 + ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))
￿￿(1 + ￿￿ ￿ ￿2)
eh +
￿
1 ￿ ￿2￿
(1 + ￿￿ ￿ ￿2)
￿
w ￿ ￿r (ICI)
with
@wI(￿)
@￿ > 0:
Proof. Proof is in Appendix B.
Note that the assumption on the primitives
￿
￿ <
(1￿￿)eh
￿
w+eh
￿
is needed to ensure that the wage in
(ICI) is at least as high as the wage in (7); which is necessary to induce participation by workers in
the general pool. The incentive compatible wage in (ICI) admits a standard e¢ ciency wage type
of interpretation. That is, to induce e⁄ort the organization has to pay the worker a premium over
his market alternative. Intuitively, the relational contract de￿ned above allows the organization to
elicit e⁄ort from the worker while limiting the rent o⁄ered to him. This is accomplished because
while the worker gets a wage premium while occupying an e¢ ciency wage position, the rent is
partially taxed back by making the worker pay an ￿entrance fee￿in the form of the uncompensated
e⁄ort he has to supply as an intern.30 This arrangement encourages interns to stay with the ￿rm
and supply high e⁄ort throughout their career in order to bene￿t from the higher wages that come
with seniority.
For the relational contract in (ICI) to be supported in equilibrium, a su¢ cient rent has to
be generated from employment. The rent is the di⁄erence between the returns to the current
arrangement and those that the two parties could achieve in their outside options. In this model,
the surplus is divided between employers and workers. To see this note that an intern prefers his
current status than staying in the outside pool (V I
ij ￿ V g). For employers, pro￿ts from hiring
interns are trivially greater than pro￿ts from hiring straight from the outside pool, which would
be the alternative way of ￿lling a vacancy, because an intern generates as much lifetime expected
30Essentially, our version of the shirking model allows an entrance fee to emerge which reduces the rent that the
employer needs to concede in order to motivate the worker. The suppression of this mechanism in the original Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984) formulation￿ by assuming that the principal pays the same wage at every period￿ was considered
a theoretical weakness of the e¢ ciency wage theory (see Carmichael 1989).
16pro￿ts as an outside worker when in a paid position, but also makes an uncompensated contribution
to the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts as an intern.
Note that we have ruled out the possibility that workers can post a performance bond (in the
form of a negative hiring wage) during the internship stage of employment. If this were possible,
then ￿rms could use this instrument to bind the participation constraint of workers (V I
ij = V g),
thereby extracting all the surplus from the employment relationship and clearing the labour market.
In reality, however, performance bonds are rarely observed. One possible explanation for this
absence is credit market imperfections that make it impossible for workers to raise the money for
the bond. More generally, the possibility of posting performance bonds raises a host of issues, as
it induces employers to cheat workers in various ways, so we proceed by assuming that ￿rms leave
some rents to workers.
2.2.3 The ￿ Volunteering￿Incentive Compatible Wage
The volunteering employment structure resembles the internship structure except that volunteering
is an implicit contract o⁄ered jointly by all participating organizations and not by one speci￿c
employer. In particular, the volunteer is initially randomly matched with an organization and
supplies high e⁄ort for that employer with no compensation; subsequently, the volunteer learns his
type and when a paid position in an organization of the same type is vacated he transitions to
that position even if this means transferring to a di⁄erent organization. We examine managers￿
incentives to sustain this structure in the next subsection.
In addition to providing incentives, since volunteering is recognized by other ￿rms, it plays the
role of facilitating matching between mission-motivated workers and organizations.31 We posit a
frictionless matching process: the matching is instantaneous and costless. We look for allocations
of workers to organizations that are voluntary and stable, in the sense that there is no pair that
could negotiate an agreement that would make both parties better o⁄than they are in their current
matches. The following lemma characterizes the nature of stable matching in the mission sector.
Lemma 2 Any stable matching equilibrium must have organizations and workers assortatively
matched.
Proof. Proof is in Appendix B.
We now turn to the determination of the incentive compatible wage for an organization hiring
volunteers. The value functions of being in any of the three possible states, employed and paid,
31In equilibrium, volunteering only occurs in the mission sector, this will be proved later, but for now we take it as
given.
17employed and unpaid (volunteer) and unemployed are identical to the ones in (3);(6); (4) and (5).
Therefore, maintaining the notation we established in the previous section, incentive compatible
wages that support assortative matching have to satisfy the following two conditions:
V
p
ij ￿ V s
ij (9)
and
wV
ii + ￿h ￿ wV
ij + ￿r (10)
The ￿rst condition is standard and ensures that the worker supplies high e⁄ort. The second
condition ensures that the payo⁄ to a worker when working for an organization of the same type is
at least as high as when working for an organization of a di⁄erent type.
Lemma 3 The relational contract (wV ;eh) between a volunteer/worker and a ￿rm consists of a
wage satisfying:
wV (￿) =
￿
1 ￿ ￿2￿
(1 + ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))
￿￿(1 + ￿￿ ￿ ￿2)
eh +
￿
1 ￿ ￿2￿
(1 + ￿￿ ￿ ￿2)
￿
w ￿ ￿h (ICV)
with
@wV (￿)
@￿ > 0:
Proof. Proof is in Appendix B.
The interpretation of the incentive compatibility wage for volunteering is analogous to that
o⁄ered above for internship: a worker receives a premium for . The analysis of the two alternative
self-enforcing mechanisms can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Conditional on a common job acquisition rate (￿), binding incentive compatible
wages in the mission sector are higher under an ￿ Internship￿relational contract than a ￿ Volunteering￿
relational contract (wI(￿) > wV (￿)):
Proof. Follows directly from (ICI), (ICV ) and noting that ￿h > ￿r.
The role that mission heterogeneity plays in the model now becomes clear. As in Besley and
Ghatak (2005), selecting workers with congruent preferences can be cost saving for organizations, as
this allows them to induce high e⁄ort at a lower wage. In addition, there are productivity gains to
be made since volunteering ensures the better matching which raises workers￿output. Consequently,
those ￿rms that can attract volunteers will be at an advantage. This feature is absent in the non-care
sectors of the economy, so for employers a volunteering contract in those sectors is not preferred
to the internship contract we discussed above. It now remains to establish that the wages and
18employment patterns which have been computed for a single worker can constitute an equilibrium
of the multiplayer game.
2.3 Selection of Relational Contract and Organizational Form
2.3.1 Mission Sector
The purpose of this sub-section is to explore the role of the interaction between the choice of
organizational form and the presence of mission preferences for the type of implicit contract that
managers will use, in equilibrium, to overcome the non-contractibility problem of workers￿e⁄ort.
In what follows, we analyze whether it is incentive compatible for managers to implement volunteer
hiring. In particular, we shall show that under the stated assumptions on the preferences of the
managers who control the organizations, a deviation from a volunteer structure is more valuable
for for-pro￿t ￿rms, which in equilibrium is going to lead to volunteering being only available to
nonpro￿t organizations.
For an organization that implements a volunteer hiring structure the composition of its work-
force, at any time t; is one wage worker plus one volunteer who awaits promotion to a paid position
next period and is going to be replaced by a new volunteer. Pro￿ts equal ￿V = pmb gm￿ wV , where
pm is the price of the ￿nal product which the ￿rm takes as given. Similarly, for an organization
which uses an internship structure, its workforce consists of one wage worker plus one intern who
will be promoted if a wage position is vacated next period and will be replaced by a new intern.
Pro￿ts equal ￿I = pmgh
m￿wI; where b gm > gh
m; re￿ ecting the fact that interns are randomly matched
with organizations.
Note that the volunteer relational contract described above creates moral hazard on the part of
the employer. Organizations have an incentive not to promote current volunteers to wage positions
and to replace them with new volunteers from the general pool, thus appropriating the unpaid
labour contribution made by volunteers. Workers anticipating that they will not receive the high
future payments have no incentive to work and thus incentives are destroyed. Thus, for volunteer
hiring to be sustainable it has to satisfy the manager￿ s incentive compatibility condition.
Consider what constitutes a deviation from the volunteering structure. Suppose that a paid
position vacancy is created. The organization deviates by reneging on the promise to hire an
individual from the volunteering pool to ￿ll its vacancy and instead hires an unpaid intern straight
from the general pool to ￿ll this position. By doing this, the manager makes a one-period gain from
not having to pay the wage she would otherwise have to, if she continued to hire volunteers to paid
positions, but has to resort to an internship structure to get around workers￿moral hazard in future
periods since workers will refuse to volunteer for her anymore. That is, organizations that cheat lose
19their reputations and are punished in future labour market dealings by the workers￿equilibrium
strategies. Punishment here consists of future workers refusing to volunteer for organizations who
have previously chosen not to promote volunteers into paid positions and to instead only accept
internship contracts from such organizations.32 This kind of grim trigger strategy requires that
labour market participants can observe whether an organization is employing a paid worker or
not. In particular, when a manager breaches the implicit agreement to promote a volunteer into a
paid position and hires another unpaid worker then during the deviation she employs only unpaid
workers; other potential workers can detect this ￿because wage payments are veri￿able information
￿and so they rationally avoid volunteering for the organization in the future. Equilibrium strategies
supporting the volunteer-hiring relational contract are explicitly de￿ned in Appendix A.
Speci￿cally, in the ￿rst period of deviation the manager hires two interns to ￿ll both the vacant
paid position and the unpaid position. Pro￿ts are ￿V d = pmgh
m. The opportunistic manager
then loses the goodwill of being an honest employer so in future periods workers only accept
internship positions that are more costly for the ￿rm because wI > wV ￿that is, the wage paid to
interns is greater than the wage paid to volunteers. Also the mismatch induced because interns are
randomly matched with organizations will also have an impact on the ability of the organization
to successfully ful￿ll its mission. That is, following a deviation, the organization￿ s mission good
production is compromised (gh
m).
Hence, volunteering is self-enforcing if the present value of honouring is greater than the present
value of reneging. The manager￿ s incentive compatibility condition writes as:
1
1 ￿ ￿
vk
j(￿V ;b gm) ￿ vk
j(￿V d;gh
m) +
￿
1 ￿ ￿
vk
j(￿I;gh
m) (11)
for each j 2 fm1;m2g, and k 2 ff;ng
where ￿V d > ￿V > ￿I and the last inequality follows from the fact that wI ￿ wV . The left-hand
side of (11) is a manager￿ s discounted payo⁄ from not cheating. The ￿rst term on the right-hand
side of (11) represents the utility the manager can attain if she cheats. Note that this would
raise pro￿ts but hurt the quality of the mission good.33 The second term captures the expected
present value payo⁄ from hiring interns, which is the hiring practice the manager implements
along the punishment path. Our goal now is to determine for which organizational form incentive
32Given this strategy of workers, the best response for managers who have reneged in the past is to continue
cheating on the promise to promote volunteers, so that workers￿strategies are a best response.
33Note that for cheating to be worthwhile it has to be that ￿
k ￿
￿
V d ￿ ￿
V ￿
￿ b(b gm)￿b(g
h
m). That is, the monetary
bene￿t from cheating (due to higher pro￿ts) has to be greater than the intrinsic loss a manager su⁄ers (due to quality
degradation). In what follows we assume that this is always true.
20compatibility is easier to satisfy. Substituting from (2) into (11) yields:
1
1 ￿ ￿
h
￿k￿V + b(b gm)
i
￿
h
￿k￿V d + b(gh
m)
i
+
￿
1 ￿ ￿
h
￿k￿I + b(gh
m)
i
which upon rearrangement and simpli￿cation implies that:
￿V ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿V d + ￿￿I ￿
1
￿k
h
b(b gm) ￿ b(gh
m)
i
(ICM)
De￿ne the right-hand side of (ICM) as ￿(￿k). The following result holds:
Proposition 2 In the mission sector, equilibrium level pro￿ts required to satisfy incentive compat-
ibility of managers under a for-pro￿t status is higher than that under a nonpro￿t status.
Proof. Because ￿(￿k) is increasing in ￿k; and ￿f > ￿n it follows that ￿(￿f) > ￿(￿n).
To gain some intuition for this result notice that the way in which the reputation mechanism
informally enforces managers￿incentive compatible behavior is by o⁄ering to the potential cheater a
￿premium￿ : a stream of payo⁄s that exceed the potential gain from cheating. This premium is given
in both monetary (i.e. higher pro￿ts) and intrinsic (i.e. better quality) terms. Under nonpro￿t
status pro￿ts are less valuable for a manager ￿because they can only be enjoyed as perks ￿so a
nonpro￿t manager places relatively more weight on the fact that if she cheats on volunteers quality
will su⁄er, and hence a smaller monetary premium is needed to maintain incentive compatibility.
This is further illuminated by inspecting (ICM): the term that is subtracted from the right-hand
side captures how heavily the loss of quality ￿due to cheating ￿is discounted. Thus, if cheating did
not a⁄ect quality then this term would be zero so the right-hand side of the inequality would be the
same across ￿rm types, and no organizational form would ￿nd it easier to attract volunteers. But
to the extent that volunteering does a⁄ect the quality of the service provided, the term is positive,
so nonpro￿t incorporation relaxes the incentive compatibility condition that makes commitment to
hiring volunteers credible. This suggests that volunteer hiring by nonpro￿ts should occur only in
￿elds where matching on mission heterogeneity has a noticeable e⁄ect on quality.
Proposition 2 has the following important implication.
Corollary 1 For-pro￿t ￿rms will not be able to participate in a volunteer hiring structure that is
just incentive compatible for nonpro￿t ￿rms.
Free entry in the mission sector will ensure that the incentive compatibility condition of the
nonpro￿t ￿rm (ICM) binds. However, when this is the case, incentive compatibility for for-
pro￿t ￿rms will be violated which means that they cannot credibly commit to hiring volunteers.
21Furthermore, if a mission-motivated manager were to enter the mission sector establishing a for-
pro￿t ￿rm and implement an internship structure she would be outcompeted by existing not-
for-pro￿t ￿rms recruiting volunteers because of their lower labour costs. Thus, incorporation as
nonpro￿t is valuable for managers because it serves as a commitment device that signals potential
volunteers that they will be fairly treated. The very factor that is usually thought of as accounting
for the e¢ ciency supremacy of for-pro￿t governance ￿ high-powered incentives ￿ can rule out
participation in the volunteering incentive structure in mission-oriented sectors.
The model￿ s prediction that only nonpro￿t ￿rms will participate in a volunteering structure and
that this will occur in mission-related activites is consistent with even a casual observation of the
pattern of sectoral distribution of volunteer activity, according to which nonpro￿t agencies are the
overwhelming recipients of volunteering services. This is even true in mixed ownership industries
(childcare, nursing homes etc) where for-pro￿t coexist and compete against nonpro￿ts in both the
service and labour markets.
For a di⁄erent perspective on the di¢ culties associated with sustaining the volunteer-hiring
structure notice that, because incentives are sector-wide and not employer-speci￿c, their provision
has the character of a public good and is susceptible to a form of free-riding. That is, each individual
employer would like to obtain labour donations from volunteers but refrain from reciprocating by
subsequently hiring them into paid positions, thereby free-riding on other organizations￿hiring of
volunteers. When the free riding is severe ￿i.e. when condition (11) fails ￿it leads to the unravelling
of the volunteering structure. The implication of Proposition 2 is that organizing the production of
collective goods by nonpro￿t organizations is a less costly way to overcome this kind of free-riding
problem.
2.3.2 Non-mission Sector
In the non-mission sector mission matching plays no role. The following result holds:
Lemma 4 In the non-mission sector managers choose for-pro￿t status.
Proof. Proof is in Appendix B
This prediction of the model is also consistent with the observation that nonpro￿t ￿rms are
absent from sectors of the economy which do not involve mission-oriented production.
Furthermore, since there is no issue of matching managers and workers in this sector internships
is the preferable hiring policy. However, when an internship structure is implemented there is still
scope for opportunistic behavior on the part of managers. In particular, when a paid position
22vacancy is created in an organization which has been hiring interns then its manager has an incentive
not to honour the promise to hire the existing intern into the paid position, but to ￿ll the position
with an unpaid worker from the general pool. Such behavior once detected by labour market
participants results in loss of reputation and is punished in future labour market interactions by
the workers￿equilibrium strategies. That is, in future periods workers will not be willing to be
recruited as unpaid interns and the manager would have to resort to paying both of its workers
an up-front wage wI satisfying (ICI). Equilibirum strategies supporting the internship hiring
structure are de￿ned in Appendix A.
The incentive compatibility condition of the manager writes as follows:
1
1 ￿ ￿
vf(￿I) ￿ vf(￿Id) +
￿
1 ￿ ￿
vf(￿e)
or equivalently
1
1 ￿ ￿
￿I ￿ ￿Id +
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿e (12)
where ￿I; ￿Id and ￿e denote per-period pro￿ts under an internship structure, the deviation, and
in the periods after the deviation respectively, and ￿d > ￿Id > ￿e. For future reference, it is useful
to rewrite (12) as:
￿I ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿Id + ￿￿e ￿ K (13)
This incentive constraint must be satis￿ed for the internship structure to be a credible recruitment
strategy. With free entry into the non-mission sector, the level of pro￿ts that a manager can enjoy
in equilibrium will satisfy (13) as equality. Notice that adding heterogeneity among unmotivated
agents would not lead to the implication that there is a nonpro￿t advantage in the non-mision
sector as well because of the absence of the non-pecuniary component in managers￿payo⁄.
3 Market Equilibrium
Up to this point we have discussed the design of incentive schemes between a given exogenously
formed manager/worker pair. We now turn attention to the steady-state analysis of a market
equilibrium where multiple managers and workers interact, and consider the choice of organizational
form (by managers) as well as the type of incentive relational contract that will be implemented
by organizations in the two sectors.
We characterize an equilibrium with sorting of agents into sectors by type. In particular,
mission-motivated managers and workers seek entrepreneurial and employment opportunities only
in the mission sector and the same is true for their unmotivated counterparts in the non-mission
sector. In addition, it will be shown that production in the mission-oriented sector will only
23be undertaken by nonpro￿t organizations, and the employment structure will take the form of the
volunteering contracts derived above. Conversely, in the non￿ mission-oriented sector, organizations
will only be for-pro￿t, and employment contracts will take the form of internships.
3.1 A ￿ Sorting￿Equilibrium
To close the model, since we did not explicitly include in workers￿preferences (1) the utility bene￿ts
derived from consumption of the services (gm;gb) produced, we assume that the demand side of
the market34 is described by a downward sloping demand schedule for the total services produced
in the mission sector and the non-mission sector respectively:
Gm = Dm(pm) and Gb = Db(pb)
where
dDm(pm)
dpm < 0 and
dDb(pb)
dpb < 0; and aggregate service provision is given by simply adding up
the individual output of all producing organizations: Gm =
P
gm and Gb =
P
gb:
In the steady-state equilibrium, the same endogenous total number of jobs Em and Eb, in the
mission and the non-mission sector respectively, are created in every period.35 We assume that
at full employment (Em + Eb = Lu + Lm) the revenue product of labour covers the opportunity
cost of labour, that is, full employment is e¢ cient. At the beginning of each period, workers in the
general pool are randomly assigned to the un￿lled vacancies created as some existing matches are
dissolved with exogenous probability 1￿￿. Workers must be willing to accept positions and supply
high e⁄ort at the going wage, and managers must be willing to create enough jobs to replace the
workers who turnover because they die and must have an incentive not to renege on the promise
to promote unpaid workers into paid positions. Formally, a steady-state equilibrium is de￿ned as
follows:
De￿nition 1 Given the aggregate demand functions Dm(pm) and Db(pb), a steady-state equilib-
rium consists of a set of wages, prices and allocations of ￿nal services (w￿
m; p￿
m; G￿
m; w￿
b; p￿
b; G￿
b)
along with a stationary allocation of workers across sectors (mission, non-mission) and states (paid
employment, unpaid employment, general pool), such that incentive compatibility is satis￿ed for both
managers and workers. In addition, no new entry, under any choice of organizational form, must
be attractive.
We now focus on identifying the conditions under which a steady-state ￿ Sorting￿equilibrium,
that is consistent with the above de￿nition, exists. The equilibrium we are interested in has the
34In the case of mission goods, both the government and individual agents may be purchasers.
35E encompasses both paid workers (P) and unpaid workers (volunteers or interns) (U); i.e. E = P + U:
24following characteristics: the mission sector attracts mission-motivated managers who establish
nonpro￿t organizations that compete with each other and hire mission-motivated workers o⁄ering
them the volunteering relational contract derived above. In the non-mission sector, unmotivated
managers establish for-pro￿t organizations that compete with each other and o⁄er unmotivated
workers the internship relational contract.
To establish conditions under which this type of ￿ Sorting￿equilibrium we hypothesize exists,
we check whether the prescribed self-selecting behavior is incentive compatible once we take into
account that workers are freely mobile between the two sectors, and that managers are free to enter
either sector. That is, for the sorting equilibrium to exist we need to con￿rm that in equilibrium
the entry of mission-motivated workers into the mission sector and of unmotivated workers into the
non-mission sector is optimal. Letting V
g
i (s) denote the discounted lifetime utility of a worker in
the general pool of type i who wishes to enter sector s, the sorting constraint for mission-motivated
workers writes as:
e V
g
i (m) ￿ e V
g
i (b) for i 2 fm1;m2g (SW1)
while the one for unmotivated workers is:
e V g
u (b) ￿ e V g
u (m) (SW2)
Similarly, the sorting constraint for mission-motivated managers is:
vn
j (e ￿V
m;b gm) ￿ v
f
j (e ￿I
b) for j 2 fm1;m2g (SM1)
and the one for unmotivated managers:
vf
u(e ￿I
b) ￿ vn
u(e ￿V
m) (SM2)
where (s) denotes that the objects in question are evaluated in the sorting equilibrium.
Also, note that in the equilibrium we are interested in, the probability of ￿nding a volunteering
position in the mission sector (￿m) for a mission-motivated worker in the general pool and for an
unmotivated worker in the general pool the probability of ￿nding an internship position in the
non-mission sector (￿b) is given respectively by:
￿m(Em) =
(1 ￿ ￿)Em
Lm ￿ Em
and ￿b(Eb) =
(1 ￿ ￿)Eb
Lb ￿ Eb
(14)
where ￿m(Em) and ￿b(Eb) are increasing functions.
We make the following assumptions on the parameters of the inverse demand functions:
25Assumption 1. fpm(Gm(Em))b gm ￿ ￿(￿n)g takes at least one value in the interval
￿
wV (0);wV (Lm)
￿
:
Assumption 2.
￿
pb(Gb(Eb))gh
b ￿ K
￿
takes at least one value in the interval
￿
wI(0);wI(Lb)
￿
:
Because wV (Em) and wI(Eb) are continuous and increasing in Em and Eb respectively, the
above restrictions on the parameters of pm(Gm) and pb(Gb) ensure that the managers￿downward
sloping incentive compatibility conditions cross the workers￿upward sloping incentive compatibility
conditions in the relevant region, that is, for Em 2 (0;Lm) and Eb 2 (0;Lb). We have:
Proposition 3 If the conditions for self-selection of workers (B-4) and managers (B-5) hold, there
exists a steady-state ￿ Sorting￿equilibrium (e wV ; e pm; Gm( e Em); e wI; e pb; Gb( e Eb)) with the following
properties:
a) The mission sector features a ￿ Volunteering￿equilibrium: type m1 and m2 managers sort into
the mission sector and establish nonpro￿t organizations hiring type m1 and m2 workers, respectively.
The employment structure takes the form of volunteering. There are
e Em
2 workers of each type:
e Em
4
volunteers and
e Em
4 wage workers and
e Em
8 organizations of each type (m1 and m2).
b) The non-mission sector features an ￿ Internship￿equilibrium: type u managers sort into the
non-mission sector and establish for-pro￿t ￿rms hiring type u workers. The employment structure
takes the form of internships. There are
e Eb
2 workers of each type:
e Eb
4 interns and
e Eb
4 wage workers
and
e Eb
4 organizations.
Proof. Proof is in Appendix B.
Conditions (B-4) and (B-5) in the proposition, which are derived in Appendix B, ensure that in
the ￿ Sorting￿equilibrium no mission-motivated worker or manager has an incentive to deviate from
sorting into their designated sector. In particular, the condition for self-selection of workers (B-4)
is not transparent and does not yield a straightforward economic interpretation.36 Nevertheless,
what this condition suggests is that the higher ￿h the more attractive employment in the mission
sector becomes for motivated workers, which makes the self-selection condition easier to satisfy.
The sorting condition for managers (B-5) suggests that motivated managers will ￿nd entry into the
mission sector preferable provided that they can extract su¢ cient economic rents (high ￿n) from
the operation of the nonpro￿t organization and/or they derive su¢ ciently strong intrinsic bene￿ts
(high b(b gm)) from contributing to the production of mission goods. In Appendix C we numerically
compute a simple parametric example which illustrates that the sorting constraints for workers and
36Ideally we would like to recast condition (B-4) in terms of only the exogenous parameters of the model, namely,
￿; ￿; e;
￿
w; ￿; Lm; Lf etc: This is possible if we postulate speci￿c functional forms for the inverse demand functions
p
m(Gm(Em)) and p
f(Gf(Ef)); in order to explicitly solve (B-7) and (B-9) for e Em and e Ef. Because this does not
yield any additional economic insight we chose to leave e Em implicitly de￿ned in condition (B-4) and demonstrate
existence with a worked example in Appendix C.
26managers in the ￿ Sorting￿equilibrium can hold in non-trivial environments.
On the managers￿side, free-entry ensures that incentive compatibility (ICM) binds. On the
workers￿side, incentive compatibility requires that condition (ICV ) is satis￿ed. The two constraints
are illustrated in ￿gure 2. Note that (ICM) is downward sloping because the inverse demand
function pm(Gm) is decreasing in the level of employment Em. Workers￿incentive compatibility
implies that equilibrium must lie on the upward sloping curve de￿ned by (ICV ), which is increasing
because
@wV (￿)
@￿ > 0 and ￿ is increasing in E. Equilibrium occurs at the intersection of the two
conditions.
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Figure 2: Volunteering Equilibrium in Mission Sector
The comparative statics of the ￿ Sorting￿equilibrium are as follows:
Corollary 2 A rise in the probability of detection (￿) or in the intensity of workers￿ intrinsic
motivation (￿h) reduces the equilibrium wage and increases the employment level. The opposite is
true when the bene￿ts of being in the general pool (
￿
w) rise. On the other hand, positive demand
shocks for the service produced Gm; Gb lead to more entry of organizations and higher equilibrium
wage and employment level.
Proof. Proof is in Appendix B.
It is noteworthy, that in both sectors, workers in the general pool would be willing to work for
less than the wage received by an identical paid worker, yet, organizations are not willing to hire
them knowing that if hired these workers would have incentive to shirk. In this sense, unemployment
27in the ￿ Sorting￿equilibrium can be characterized as involuntary ￿the kind commonly associated
with e¢ ciency wage models, for example Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). However, compared to a
benchmark equilibrium where all workers are hired directly into e¢ ciency wage positions we have
the following result:
Proposition 4 If pm(Gm) >
￿(￿n)
b gm￿
gh
m
2
, for Em 2 (0;Lm); then in any ￿ Sorting￿equilibrium, employ-
ment and output in both sectors are higher than those that would occur if organizations employed
only paid workers and paid them e¢ ciency wages.
Proof. Proof is in Appendix B.
The restriction on the parameters of the inverse demand function pm(Gm) is a su¢ cient but not
necessary condition for this to be true. The intuition for the result in the proposition is simple. The
model predicts that workers￿incentive compatible wages, when volunteer hiring is implemented, are
less sensitive to employment rates than those when workers are hired directly into paid positions.
Having to go through an unpaid stage before hired into a paid position, if they are caught shirking,
induces a harsher punishment so it reduces the wage premium needed to motivate volunteers or
interns, from that in the benchmark case where workers in the general pool are directly hired into
paid positions. Also, organizations￿demand for labour is lower when at any point in time both
workers need to be compensated, so managers￿incentive compatibility constraint is shifted down
and tilted.37 Both e⁄ects result in the employment level at the sorting equilibrium to be higher
than the benchmark case. This is illustrated in ￿gure 3, where the intersection of the blue lines
corresponds to the equilibrium with volunteer hiring (point V ), while the intersection of the red
lines indicates the equilibrium with only paid workers (point B).
To summarize the key points made so far, starting from the premise that some individuals
view volunteer experience as a stepping stone for a professional career, the ￿ Sorting￿equilibrium
described provides a plausible explanation for why voluntary e⁄ort is almost exclusively elicited
by not-for-pro￿t organizations and why competing for-pro￿t corporations cannot duplicate the
incentives needed to support a sector-wide volunteer-hiring structure. Furthermore, by relaxing
the incentive compatibility constraint of workers, employment and service provision in the ￿ Sorting￿
equilibrium move closer to the full employment levels.
A limitation of the ￿ Sorting￿ equilibrium is the counterfactual prediction that all hiring by
nonpro￿t organizations in the mission sector is done from the volunteer pool. However, we believe
that this shortcoming arises because of our stylized assumption of a homogeneous (in ability)
workforce. In other words, what the model predicts is that if two otherwise identical workers apply
37The condition in the proposition ensures that this is true.
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Figure 3: Volunteering Equilibrium (point V ) vs E¢ ciency Wage Equilibrium (point B)
for a paid position, then the organization will always choose the worker who has some volunteering
experience over a person who has none, which seems to be a plausible description of the way
nonpro￿t employers screen applicants.
3.2 Welfare Analysis
Our task in this sub-section is to assess some welfare properties of the two-sector ￿ sorting￿equilib-
rium. In particular, we are interested in gauging its performance against the e¢ cient benchmark
set by a social planner. It will be demonstrated that the ￿ Sorting￿equilibrium is constrained Pareto
e¢ cient, as a planner, maximizing a representative worker￿ s expected utility subject to the same in-
formational constraints faced by agents, would not be able to improve worker￿ s welfare. In addition,
we will show that the ￿ Sorting￿equilibrium has some desirable welfare properties as it generates
more employment and output than a benchmark equilibrium where only paid workers are employed,
or one where ￿rms hire interns.
To begin notice that although both the volunteering and the internship structures partly over-
come workers￿moral hazard, they introduce another source of ine¢ ciency because producing or-
ganizations must earn a rent in order to be deterred from behaving opportunistically. As a result,
a wedge between marginal production cost and price is created, and the socially optimal amount
of service is not produced. To illustrate the welfare losses induced by these two frictions, we de-
compose the departure from the ￿rst best allocation into two parts: one due to workers￿moral
29hazard and one due to ￿rms￿moral hazard. The analysis is signi￿cantly aided by reference to
￿gure (4). First, note that in the absence of any informational constraints the ￿rst best alloca-
tion would correspond to full employment, point FB in ￿gure (4). Let us now introduce the two
frictions successively: ￿rst, we seek the point that maximizes a representative worker￿ s expected
utility subject to worker￿ s incentive compatibility constraint (16) and the feasibility constraint (17)
assuming away the commitment problem of ￿rms:
max
w;E
(w + ￿h ￿ eh)
E
2
+ (￿eh)
E
2
+
￿
w(Lm ￿ E) (15)
subject to:
w ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿2￿￿
1 + ￿
(1￿￿)E
Lm￿E ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿￿
￿
1 + ￿
(1￿￿)E
Lm￿E ￿ ￿2
￿ eh +
￿
1 ￿ ￿2￿
￿
1 + ￿
(1￿￿)E
Lm￿E ￿ ￿2
￿
￿
w ￿ ￿h (16)
and
w ￿ pm(Gm)b gm (17)
The solution to this problem would be given by the intersection of the workers￿incentive compati-
bility condition (16) and the binding feasibility condition (17); point P in ￿gure (4).
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The planner would increase wages until there are zero pro￿ts. Note the ￿rst departure from
30￿rst best: point P implies lower employment level and therefore service provision than the ￿rst
best, point FB. Next we add ￿rms￿binding incentive compatibility constraint:
￿V (pm(Gm);Em) = pm(Gm)b gm ￿ w ￿ ￿(￿n) (18)
and let the planner choose the allocation that would maximize a representative worker￿ s welfare.
The planner would now choose point V , the volunteering equilibrium, which occurs at the intersec-
tion of (16) and (18). The fact that (16) is upward sloping and (18) is a parallel inward shift of the
planner￿ s feasibility condition by the vertical distance ￿(￿n) implies that point V in ￿gure (4) will
occur at an even lower employment level introducing a second departure from ￿rst best. Therefore,
the volunteering equilibrium is constrained Pareto e¢ cient, since a social planner subject to the two
informational constraints could not increase the welfare of workers, but does not produce the ￿rst
best amount of service gm. The same logic applies to the internship equilibrium in the non-mission
sector so we do not repeat it here.
The above argumentation is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 a) In the mission sector, the ￿ Volunteering￿equilibrium is constrained Pareto e¢ -
cient but fails to produce the optimal amount of gm.
b) In the non-mission sector, the ￿ Internship￿equilibrium is constrained Pareto e¢ cient but fails
to produce the optimal amount of gb.
We next compare worker￿ s welfare in the mission sector when the two alternative employment
practices are implemented, that is, we compare the volunteering equilibrium to the equilibrium that
would occur in the same market if organizations instead of horizontally sorting workers were using
the next best alternative hiring practice, the internal promotion of interns.38
Proposition 6 In the mission sector, if pm(Gm) >
￿(￿n)￿K
b gm￿gh
m ; for Em 2 (0;Lm); then an equilibrium
with a volunteer-hiring structure always generates more employment and service provision than an
equilibrium with interns. Moreover, workers￿welfare is enhanced.
Proof. Proof is in Appendix B
In the Volunteering equilibrium, higher intrinsic motivation partly substitutes the monetary
compensation needed at each level of employment to sustain incentive compatible behavior of
workers. Consequently, in this situation more matches can be supported and therefore employment
38This thought experiment would make no sense in the pro￿t sector as in that sector workers and organizations
are homogeneous so the two hiring practices would yield identical equilibrium outcomes.
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Figure 5: Volunteering Equilibrium (point V) vs Equilibrium with Internships (point I)
and production in the mission sector is enhanced. The two types of equilibria are depicted in
￿gure 5. Though the model presented here is too stylized to be taken as a literal account of the
functioning of the labour market for volunteers, we believe it is suggestive of the welfare bene￿ts
that the interaction between volunteering activity and nonpro￿t organizations can achieve.
4 Discussion
There is ample anecdotal evidence in the literature of the selection and sorting of managers and
workers across nonpro￿t organizations and proprietary ￿rms modelled in this paper. Hansmann
(1980) mentions the possibility that the nondistribution constraint may act as a screening device
that selects the type of entrepreneurs (managers) and workers who are more concerned about the
quality of the service being provided and less interested in monetary rewards than other individuals.
Weisbrod (1988) suggests that this process is indeed taking place:
￿ Managers, will, therefore, sort themselves, each gravitating to the types of organizations that
he or she ￿nds least restrictive￿ most compatible with his or her preferences. As a result, non-
pro￿t and proprietary organizations, having di⁄erent legal regulations, will attract managers with
systematically di⁄erent goals.￿ (pg 32)
He also reports case studies which ￿nd that business school and law school students who sub-
32sequently enter the nonpro￿t sector vary substantially in terms of personality traits, values and
behavior from their colleagues preferring to pursue a career in the for-pro￿t sector.
Moreover, our model suggests that those individuals who gravitate toward the mission sector are
better-o⁄than if they sought employment in the non-mission sector ￿even if they may have to su⁄er
a wage penalty ￿because they derive intrinsic satisfaction from their work. In contrast, individuals
with strong monetary motivations are deterred from seeking employment in the mission sector and
opt for positions in the non-mission sector. This may explain the general perception that nonpro￿t
workers, despite being relatively poorly compensated, enjoy high levels of job satisfaction. Mirvis
and Hackett (1983), analyzing the Quality of Employment Survey report that nonpro￿t workers
may receive lower wages and bene￿ts than their for-pro￿t counterparts, but are more likely to ￿nd
the orientation of their work more important than the money they earn and to receive intrinsic
rewards from doing their jobs. In a similar vein, Frank (1996) using a dataset of Cornell graduates
￿nds sizeable salary di⁄erentials between graduates employed in the pro￿t sector and the nonpro￿t
sector, after controlling for a rich set of job and individual characteristics. Though these di⁄erences
admit other interpretations, they can be attributed to the self-selection of intrinsically motivated
individuals ￿who are willing to accept a lower wage (compensating di⁄erential) for the possibility
to contribute to a goal in which they ￿nd intrinsic value ￿into the nonpro￿t sector.
5 Conclusion
This paper helps us understand a number of related observations regarding volunteer activity and
the sectoral concentration of nonpro￿t ￿rms. By committing not to distribute surpluses, the non-
pro￿t status ensures that the social mission takes precedence over the ￿nancial remuneration of any
interested parties. We have shown how this commitment allows nonpro￿t ￿rms alone to sustain a
sector-wide incentive structure ￿volunteer hiring ￿which is capable of initially extracting labour
donations from volunteers and subsequently compensates them with higher wages as they transi-
tion to paid positions. In addition, we argued that volunteering facilitates the matching of workers
and organizations with similar mission preferences. The tighter congruence of organizations￿and
workers￿goals in nonpro￿t organizations o⁄ers them a competitive advantage in mission-oriented
sectors. In the non-mission oriented sector of the economy there is no scope for nonpro￿t organiza-
tions to be founded since the for-pro￿t structure is preferable in that it allows the managernowner to
fully appropriate pro￿ts, whereas the nonpro￿t status rules out this possibility. Consequently, the
simple framework developed here explains endogenously the observed dichotomy that the mission-
oriented sector is associated with nonpro￿t organizations, which hire volunteers and sort them into
paid positions based on their intrinsic preferences, whereas the non-mission sector implements the
internship structure and is occupied by pro￿t taking ￿rms. In addition, our analysis suggests that
33this arrangement improves the provision of public goods and services and therefore highlights an
important productive component of volunteer activity.
Finally, we should add that both the view that volunteering acts simply as a screening device
and/or as a form of investment in human capital, and the incentive provision (rent extraction)
and matching theory we propose here lead to similar predictions regarding the process of volunteer
engagement, which makes them empirically indistinguishable. There is, however, a crucial piece
of evidence which the volunteering as screening and human capital investment views cannot be
reconciled with. That is, these alternative candidate explanations would suggest that volunteer
hiring should be a widespread hiring practice in mixed sectors, whereas in reality volunteering
activity is restricted to nonpro￿t organizations while for-pro￿t organizations seem to have very
limited ability to recruit volunteers. We believe that the theory presented here, while consistent with
the alternative views of volunteer motivation, provides a possible rationale for the less widespread
use of volunteers by for-pro￿t organizations.
34A Appendix A: Equilibrium Strategies supporting the Relational
Contracts.
A.1 Information Sets
We let hw
i (t) denote worker i0s public history up to time t, with hw
i (t) = 1 if the worker has not
been involved in a separation due to cheating, and hw
i (t) = 0; otherwise. Similarly, a manager j0s
public history is denoted hm
j (t); with hm
j (t) = 1 if the manager has not been involved in a separation
due to cheating, and hm
j (t) = 0; otherwise. We let qi(t) denote worker i0s e⁄ort contribution up to
time t; with qi(t) = 1 if the worker has delivered promised e⁄ort and qi(t) = 0; otherwise. Also,
we let fj(t) denote whether manager j has honoured all previous promises made to workers, with
fj(t) = 1 if she has and fj(t) = 0 otherwise.
Furthermore, if worker i has provided promised e⁄ort when working for j or has shirked but
has not been caught (an event which occurs with probability 1￿￿) then we let qij(t) = 1, whereas
if the worker has been caught shirking (an event which occurs with probability ￿) it is qij(t) = 0.
Similarly, let fij(t) denote whether manager j has honoured all previous promises made to worker
i; with fij(t) = 1 if all promises were honoured and fij(t) = 0; otherwise.
Agents know all previous wage payments made since this is veri￿able information. We let
H(t) = fw0;w1;:::wt￿1g denote the history of wage payments made up to time t:
Let W denote the set of all workers and M the set of all managers, then worker i0s information
set in period t; is given by the collection of the public histories of all workers and managers up to
time t ￿ 1; hW(t ￿ 1)[ hM(t ￿ 1) [ H(t ￿ 1), as well as the private information he has from his
own employment history qi(t ￿ 1) and his interactions with employers [
j2Mi
fij(t ￿ 1), where Mi
is the set of managers for whom worker i has worked. Similarly, manager j0s information set in
period t comprises the collection of the public histories of all workers and managers up to time
t ￿ 1; hW(t ￿ 1)[ hM(t ￿ 1) [ H(t ￿ 1), as well as the private information she has from her own
history as employer fj(t￿1) and her interactions with her workers [
i2Wj
qij(t￿1), where Wj is the
set of workers that manager j has employed.
A.2 Strategy Space
Strategies consist of rules that specify a worker￿ s and a manager￿ s set of actions at each information
set and time t.
￿ Worker: A strategy ￿w(t) for the worker speci￿es two sorts of actions. First, it speci￿es
35whether to accept an employment o⁄er (volunteering or internship) from every manager. An
o⁄er consists of an unpaid position along with a promise of promotion to a wage position
(within the organization in the case of an internship, in an organization of matching type
in the case of volunteering), when a vacancy is created, as well as a wage o⁄er (w). In the
second stage, for a worker who has accepted the o⁄er from a given employer, and is either in
the unpaid or the paid position, the strategy speci￿es whether to provide high e⁄ort (qi = 1)
or not (qi = 0) and whether to continue in the employment relationship or quit.
￿ Manager: A strategy ￿m(t) for a manager speci￿es the following set of actions. Firstly, it
speci￿es what type of employment o⁄er to make to workers: volunteering or internship, and
the accompanying wages. Secondly, if a volunteering structure is implemented, it speci￿es
whether to honour the promise to promote a worker from the pool of volunteers when a paid
position opening has occurred (fj = 1) or to renege on the promise (fj = 0) by ￿lling the
vacancy with an intern hired from the general pool. Finally, it speci￿es whether to continue
an employment relationship or not.
A.3 Equilibrium Strategies supporting the Volunteering Structure
In what follows we describe the actions that the equilibrium strategies
￿
￿￿w
i (t);￿￿m
j (t)
￿
supporting
the volunteering structure prescribe in every possible information set.
Worker￿ s strategy ￿￿w
i (t):
1. If manager j0s incentive compatibility constraint, as de￿ned in (11), is satis￿ed, and hm
j (t ￿
1) = 1 and hw
i (t ￿ 1) = 1, and qi(t ￿ 1)fij(t ￿ 1) = 1, then accept a volunteering position
promising promotion to a wage position of wV , satisfying (ICV ), and set qij = 1. Otherwise,
do not accept a volunteering position. If the worker is already in a paid position then accept
any wage o⁄er. If hm
j (t ￿ 1) = 1 and hw
i (t ￿ 1) = 1, and qi(t ￿ 1)fij(t ￿ 1) = 1, and the
up-front wage wV satis￿es (ICV ), then set qij = 1, otherwise set qij = 0.
2. If hw
i (t￿1) = 1, and qi(t￿1)fij(t￿1) = 1, then accept an internship position in organization
j promising a wage of wI, satisfying (ICI), and set qij = 1. Otherwise, do not accept an
internship position. If the worker is already in a paid position then accept any wage o⁄er. If
hw
i (t￿1) = 1, and qi(t￿1)fij(t￿1) = 1, and the up-front wage o⁄er wI satis￿es (ICI), then
set qij = 1, otherwise set qij = 0.
3. Terminate a relationship with a manager if promised promotion or promised wage o⁄er have
not been met.
36Manager￿ s strategy ￿￿m
j (t):
1. If the manager￿ s incentive compatibility constraint (11) is satis￿ed, and hm
j (t ￿ 1) = 1 and
hw
i (t￿1) = 1, and qij(t￿1)fj(t￿1) = 1, then: a) O⁄er worker i a volunteering position. b)
Honour the promise to promote a worker i from the volunteer pool into a paid position (fj = 1)
whether i has volunteered for j or not, when there is a paid work vacancy. c) If a worker i is
an existing paid worker with hm
j (t￿1) = 1 and hw
i (t￿1) = 1, and qi(t￿1)fij(t￿1) = 1, who
has received previous payment of w ￿ wV , make him an up-front wage o⁄er of wV satisfying
(ICV ).
2. If the manager￿ s incentive compatibility constraint (11) is satis￿ed, and hm
j (t ￿ 1) = 0 and
hw
i (t ￿ 1) = 1, and qij(t ￿ 1)fj(t ￿ 1) = 1, then: a) O⁄er worker i an internship position.
b) Honour the promise to promote a worker i who has interned for you into a paid position
(fj = 1), when there is a paid work vacancy. c) If a worker i is an existing paid worker with
an internship history with you and hm
j (t￿1) = 1 and hw
i (t￿1) = 1, and qij(t￿1)fj(t￿1) = 1,
then make him an up-front wage o⁄er of wI.
3. If (11) is satis￿ed, and hm
j (t ￿ 1) = 1, hw
i (t ￿ 1) = 1 and qij(t ￿ 1)fj(t ￿ 1) = 0, then make
no o⁄er to worker i:
4. If (11) is satis￿ed, and hm
j (t ￿ 1) = 1 and hw
i (t ￿ 1) = 0, then make no o⁄er to worker i:
5. If (11) is violated, and hm
j (t ￿ 1) = 0, hw
i (t ￿ 1) = 1 and qij(t ￿ 1)fj(t ￿ 1) = 1, then: a)
O⁄er worker i an internship position b) Honour the promise to promote worker i into a paid
position (fj = 1); when there is a paid work vacancy. c) If worker i is an existing paid worker
with an internship history and hw
i (t￿1) = 1, and qij(t￿1)fj(t￿1) = 1, then make worker i
a wage o⁄er of wI.
6. If (11) is violated, and either hm
j (t ￿ 1) = 0, or hw
i (t ￿ 1) = 1; or qij(t ￿ 1)fj(t ￿ 1) = 1 does
not hold, then make no o⁄er to worker i.
The above strategies induce a perfect equilibrium of the repeated game, in which managers
choose to set up a volunteering structure. Workers accept volunteering positions with a promise
of promotion to a paid position paying wV and choose not to shirk, while managers honour their
promises to promote only workers with volunteering experience and rehire workers who have pro-
vided the promised e⁄ort. Note that the above strategies describe behavior both on and o⁄ the
equilibrium path, for instance, after one of the parties reneges on a promise. To see this, note
that under the equilibrium strategy ￿￿m
i (t) a manager who has cheated on a promise to promote
volunteers and has therefore lost reputation, will continue to exploit future volunteers, and this
37would be a best response to workers￿equilibrium strategy ￿￿w
i (t) of not accepting volunteer posi-
tions in organizations with stained reputations. In turn, a worker￿ s best response facing a manager
who has lost reputation is to only accept internship positions paying wI > wV , which is what
the equilibrium strategy ￿￿w
i (t) prescribes. Also, this is the best the manager can do since under
￿￿w
i (t) workers o⁄ered a lower up-front wage will shirk. Or suppose that a worker shirks. Then
the equilibrium strategy of the manager states that the worker should not be hired again. This is
optimal given that the worker￿ s equilibrium strategy says that a shirking worker will shirk again
even if the wage o⁄er is wV . Furthermore, this is the optimal thing for the worker to do, since the
equilibrium strategy of the manager calls for a shirking worker not to be hired again.
A.4 Equilibrium Strategies supporting the Internship Structure
Worker￿ s strategy
￿
￿
w
i (t):
1. If manager j0s incentive compatibility constraint, as de￿ned in (12) below, is satis￿ed, and
hm
j (t￿1) = 1 and hw
i (t￿1) = 1, and qi(t￿1)fij(t￿1) = 1, then accept an internship position
promising promotion to a wage position of wI, satisfying (ICI), and set qij = 1. Otherwise,
do not accept an internship position. If the worker is already in a paid position then accept
any wage o⁄er. If hm
j (t ￿ 1) = 1 and hw
i (t ￿ 1) = 1, and qi(t ￿ 1)fij(t ￿ 1) = 1, and the
up-front wage wI satis￿es (ICI), then set qij = 1, otherwise set qij = 0.
2. Accept any non-negative up-front wage o⁄er. If hw
i (t￿1) = 1, and qi(t￿1)fij(t￿1) = 1, and
the up-front wage o⁄er satis￿es wI satis￿es (ICI), then set qij = 1, otherwise set qij = 0.
3. Terminate a relationship with an organization if promised promotion or promised wage o⁄er
have not been met.
Manager￿ s strategy
￿
￿
m
j (t):
1. If the manager￿ s incentive compatibility constraint (12) is satis￿ed, and hm
j (t ￿ 1) = 1 and
hw
i (t ￿ 1) = 1, and qij(t ￿ 1)fj(t ￿ 1) = 1, then: a) O⁄er worker i an internship position.
b) Honour the promise to promote a worker i who has interned for you into a paid position
(fj = 1), when there is a paid work vacancy. c) If a worker i is an existing paid worker with
an internship history with you and hm
j (t￿1) = 1 and hw
i (t￿1) = 1, and qij(t￿1)fj(t￿1) = 1,
then make him an up-front wage o⁄er of wI.
2. If the manager￿ s incentive compatibility constraint (12) is satis￿ed, and hm
j (t ￿ 1) = 0 and
38hw
i (t ￿ 1) = 1, and qij(t ￿ 1)fj(t ￿ 1) = 1, then o⁄er an up-front wage o⁄er wI satisfying
(ICI).
3. If (12) is satis￿ed, and hm
j (t ￿ 1) = 1, hw
i (t ￿ 1) = 1 and qij(t ￿ 1)fj(t ￿ 1) = 0, then make
no o⁄er to worker i:
4. If (12) is satis￿ed, and hm
j (t ￿ 1) = 1 and hw
i (t ￿ 1) = 0, then make no o⁄er to worker i:
5. If (12) is violated, and hm
j (t ￿ 1) = 0, hw
i (t ￿ 1) = 1 and qij(t ￿ 1)fj(t ￿ 1) = 1, then make
worker i a wage o⁄er of wI.
6. If (12) is violated, and either hm
j (t ￿ 1) = 0, or hw
i (t ￿ 1) = 1; or qij(t ￿ 1)fj(t ￿ 1) = 1 does
not hold, then make no o⁄er to worker i.
The above strategies give rise to a perfect equilibrium of the repeated game, in which workers
accept internship positions with a promise of promotion to a paid position paying wI and choose
not to shirk, while managers honour their promises to promote interns into paid positions and
rehire workers who have provided the promised e⁄ort.
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Proof of Lemma 1: It is
V
g
i =
￿
w + ￿[￿V I
ij + (1 ￿ ￿)V
g
i ]
) V
g
i =
￿
w + ￿￿V I
ij
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(B-1)
and
V I
ij = ￿eh + ￿
h
(1 ￿ ￿)V
p
ij + ￿V I
ij
i
) V I
ij =
￿eh + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)V
p
ij
1 ￿ ￿2 (B-2)
while
V
p
ij = wI + ￿ij ￿ eh + ￿V
p
ij
) V
p
ij =
wI + ￿ij ￿ eh
1 ￿ ￿
(B-3)
and
V s
ij = wI + ￿ij + ￿
￿
￿V g + (1 ￿ ￿)V s
ij
￿
) V s
ij =
wI + ￿ij + ￿￿V g
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
So, incentive compatibility implies:
V
p
ij ￿ V s
ij =
wI + ￿ij + ￿￿V g
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
=
wI + ￿ij
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
+
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
0
@
￿
w + ￿￿V I
ij
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
1
A )
V
p
ij ￿
wI + ￿ij
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
+
￿￿
￿
w
(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿))(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿))
+
￿2￿￿
(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿))(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿))
 
￿eh + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)V
p
ij
1 ￿ ￿2
!
Substituting from (B-3) and rearranging yields the incentive compatible wage in (ICI).
Also note that straightforward computation yields:
@wI(￿)
@￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)eh ￿ ￿
￿
￿
w + eh
￿
, which is
positive under the condition stated in the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 2: An assortatively matched pair generates strictly more surplus than one where
types di⁄er. When workers￿type matches the type of the organization, provision of the mission
40good (gm) is enhanced (gm = b gm > gh
m). Consider a matching-equilibrium without assortatively
matched pairs. An organization employing a worker of a di⁄erent type would have an incentive to
attract a worker of the same type by o⁄ering him some share of the higher surplus. This would
also be preferred by the worker thus undoing the stability of the equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 3: Similar to that of Lemma 1, so omitted.
Proof of Lemma 4: Follows from the fact that in the non￿ mission sector there is no commitment
bene￿t to being nonpro￿t. Thus, managers will ￿nd it optimal to set up for-pro￿t ￿rms since the
for-pro￿t status makes them full residual claimants of the organization￿ s net earnings.
Derivation of the Sorting conditions (B-4) and (B-5): We derive the sorting conditions of
workers by computing directly e V
g
u (m); e V
g
u (b) and e V
g
i (m); e V
g
i (b) for i 2 fm1;m2g. Substituting
recursively (B-3) into (B-2) and then into (B-1) gives:
e V
g
U(m) =
￿
w
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿m( e Em)
￿
￿￿m( e Em)eh
(1 ￿ ￿2)(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿m( e Em))
+
￿2￿m( e Em)
(1 ￿ ￿2)(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿m( e Em))
(e wV ￿ eh)
e Vi
g
(b) =
￿
w
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿b( e Eb)
￿
￿￿b( e Eb)eh
(1 ￿ ￿2)(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿b( e Eb))
+
￿2￿b( e Eb)
(1 ￿ ￿2)(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿b( e Eb))
(e wI ￿ eh) for i 2 fu;m1;m2g
e V
g
i (m) =
￿
w
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿m( e Em)
￿
￿￿m( e Em)eh
(1 ￿ ￿2)(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿m( e Em))
+
￿2￿m( e Em)
(1 ￿ ￿2)(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿m( e Em))
(e wV + ￿h ￿ eh) for i 2 fm1;m2g
where e Em and e Eb are implicitly de￿ned below by (B-7) and (B-9) respectively. Substituting these
41expressions into (SW1) and (SW2) and rearranging yields:
￿b( e Eb)(1 ￿ ￿)
h
￿wI( e Eb) ￿ (1 + ￿)(
￿
w + eh)
i
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿b( e Eb)
￿￿
wV ( e Eb) + ￿h
￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)(
￿
w + eh) ￿ ￿2￿b( e Eb)wI( e Eb)
<
￿m( e Em) <
￿b( e Eb)(1 ￿ ￿)
h
￿wI( e Eb) ￿ (1 + ￿)(
￿
w + eh)
i
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿b( e Eb)
￿￿
wV ( e Em)
￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)(
￿
w + eh) ￿ ￿2￿b( e Eb)wI( e Eb)
(B-4)
For mission-motivated managers the sorting constraint (SM1) implies that:
￿ne ￿V + b(b gm) > e ￿I
b ) ￿n >
pb(Gb( e Eb))gh
b ￿ wI( e Eb) ￿ b(b gm)
pm(Gm( e Em))b gm ￿ wV ( e Em)
and the one for unmotivated managers (SM2) implies that:
e ￿I
b > ￿ne ￿V ) ￿n <
pb(Gb( e Eb))gh
b ￿ wI( e Eb)
pm(Gm( e Em))b gm ￿ wV ( e Em)
so combining these two, one obtains
pb(Gb( e Eb))gh
b ￿ wI( e Eb) ￿ b(b gm)
pm(Gm( e Em))b gm ￿ wV ( e Em)
< ￿n <
pb(Gb( e Eb))gh
b ￿ wI( e Eb)
pm(Gm( e Em))b gm ￿ wV ( e Em)
(B-5)
Proof of Proposition 3: Part (a). The choice of nonpro￿t organizational form follows from
Corollary 1. The equilibrium strategies supporting the volunteer structure are described in Appen-
dix A. To prove the rest of the proposition we analyze the interaction of incentive compatibility
conditions for workers and managers. On the managers￿side, free-entry ensures that incentive
compatibility (ICM) binds:
￿V (pm(Gm);Em) = pm(Gm)b gm ￿ w = ￿(￿n) (B-6)
On the workers￿side, incentive compatibility requires that condition (ICV ) is satis￿ed. Combining
(B-6) and (ICV ) yields:
￿
1 ￿ ￿2￿￿
1 + ￿
(1￿￿) e Em
Lm￿ e Em
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿￿
￿
1 + ￿
(1￿￿) e Em
Lm￿ e Em
￿ ￿2
￿ eh +
￿
1 ￿ ￿2￿
￿
1 + ￿
(1￿￿) e Em
Lm￿ e Em
￿ ￿2
￿
￿
w ￿ ￿h (B-7)
￿ pm(Gm( e Em))b gm + ￿(￿n) = 0
42Assumption 1 ensures that the two conditions cross in the relevant region, that is, (B-7) has a
solution in the interval (0;Lm).
Part (b). The choice of for-pro￿t status follows from lemma 4. The equilibrium strategies
supporting the internship structure are described in Appendix A. On the managers￿side, free-entry
implies that incentive compatibility (13) binds:
￿I(pb(Gb);Eb) = pb(Gb)gh
b ￿ w = K (B-8)
On the workers￿side, incentive compatibility requires that condition (ICI) is satis￿ed. Note that
(B-8) is downward sloping because the inverse demand function pb(Gb) is decreasing in the level
of employment Eb: The free-entry-condition requires that equilibrium must lie on the downward
sloping curve de￿ned by: wI = pb(Gb)gh
b ￿ K; while the workers￿incentive compatibility implies
that equilibrium must lie on the upward sloping curve de￿ned by:
wI(Eb) =
￿
1 ￿ ￿2￿￿
1 + ￿
(1￿￿)Eb
Lb￿Eb ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿￿
￿
1 + ￿
(1￿￿)Eb
Lb￿Eb ￿ ￿2
￿ eh +
￿
1 ￿ ￿2￿
￿
1 + ￿
(1￿￿)Eb
Lb￿Eb ￿ ￿2
￿
￿
w ￿ ￿r
Equilibrium occurs at the intersection of these two. Assumption 2 ensures that the two conditions
cross in the relevant region, that is,
￿
1 ￿ ￿2￿￿
1 + ￿
(1￿￿) e Eb
Lb￿ e Eb
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿￿
￿
1 + ￿
(1￿￿) e Eb
Lb￿ e Eb
￿ ￿2
￿ eh+
￿
1 ￿ ￿2￿
￿
1 + ￿
(1￿￿) e Eb
Lb￿ e Eb
￿ ￿2
￿
￿
w￿￿r￿pb(Gb( e Eb))gh
b +K = 0 (B-9)
has a solution in the interval (0;Lb).
Proof of Corollary 2: Follows from observing that increasing (￿) or (￿) shifts workers￿incentive
compatibility condition downwards so the equilibrium point moves along the downward sloping
managers￿incentive compatibility constraint. Similarly, increasing pm(Gm); pb(Gb); shifts up man-
agers￿incentive compatibility constraint, which causes the equilibrium to occur at a higher point
along workers￿upward sloping incentive compatibility constraint.
Proof of Proposition 4: First, let us de￿ne workers￿value functions associated with the bench-
mark scheme of hiring workers directly into paid positions. We denote the expected lifetime value
of being in a paid position and not-shirking (Up); being in a paid position and shirking (Us) and
43being in the general pool (Ug). It is
Up = wBM + ￿ij ￿ eh + ￿Up
) Up =
wBM + ￿ij ￿ eh
1 ￿ ￿
(B-10)
while
Ug =
￿
w + ￿[￿Up + (1 ￿ ￿)Up]
) Ug =
￿
w + ￿￿Up
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
and
Us = wBM + ￿ij + ￿ [￿Ug + (1 ￿ ￿)Us]
) Us =
wBM + ￿ij + ￿￿Ug
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿
Incentive compatibility requires that:
Up ￿ Us =
wBM + ￿ij + ￿￿Ug
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿
=
wBM + ￿ij
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿
+
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿
  ￿
w + ￿￿Up
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
!
Substituting from (B-10) and rearranging implies:
wBM ￿
1 + ￿￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿
eh ￿ ￿r +
￿
w (B-11)
where ￿ij = ￿r because of random matching. Therefore, (B-11) is workers￿incentive compatibility
constraint in the benchmark case. Recall that wV = (1￿￿2)(1+￿￿￿￿(1￿￿))
￿￿(1+￿￿￿￿2) eh + (1￿￿2)
(1+￿￿￿￿2)
￿
w ￿ ￿h is
workers￿incentive compatibility constraint under the volunteering structure. Because ￿r < ￿h and
(1￿￿2)
(1+￿￿￿￿2) < 1; wBM will have a higher intercept and increase more steeply in ￿ than wV : Also,
note that the free-entry condition in the benchmark case becomes:
pm(Gm)gh
m ￿ 2w = 0 ) w =
pm(Gm)gh
m
2
Recall that the free-entry condition for the volunteering structure is w = pm(Gm)b gm ￿ ￿(￿n):
Therefore, the benchmark free-entry condition is shifted inwards. For this to be true, it has to be
that:
pm(Gm)b gm ￿ ￿(￿n) >
pm(Gm)gh
m
2
) pm(Gm)
h
2b gm ￿ gh
m
i
> 2￿(￿n)
which is the condition in the proposition. Consequently, equilibrium in the benchmark case will
44occur at a lower employment level as ￿gure 3 illustrates.
Proof of Proposition 6: First note that workers￿incentive compatibility constraint with intern-
ships (ICI) is shifted up by the di⁄erence (￿h ￿ ￿r) relative to workers￿incentive compatibility
constraint with volunteers (ICV ). In addition, managers￿incentive compatibility constraint is
shifted down. To see this, note that the managers￿binding incentive compatibility constraint for
internships writes as: pm(Gm)gh
m ￿w = K
0
) w = pm(Gm)gh
m ￿K, where K is the level of pro￿ts
that would make the incentive compatibility constraint for managers bind. Therefore, the free-entry
condition for internships is shifted inwards if
pm(Gm)b gm ￿ ￿(￿n) > pm(Gm)gh
m ￿ K ) pm(Gm)
h
b gm ￿ gh
m
i
> ￿(￿n) ￿ K
which is the condition in the proposition.
Both of these e⁄ects imply that the two constraints that de￿ne equilibrium will always cross
at a point with more employment (EV > EI) in the case where volunteer hiring is supported,
as illustrated in ￿gure 5. Note also that, as long as (15) gives rise to indi⁄erence curves that
are steeper than the managers￿incentive compatibility constraint (i:e: w+￿h￿
￿
w￿2eh
E >
dpm(Gm)gh
m
dE ),
then the volunteering equilibrium (point V ) will be welfare improving for workers relative to the
internship equilibrium (point I).
45C Appendix C: A Parametric Example of a ￿ Sorting￿Equilibrium
In this Appendix we provide a parametric example which demonstrates the existence of the Sorting
equilibrium, by checking that it satis￿es the existence conditions (B-7), (B-9), (B-4) and (B-5).
C.1 Parameter Values
We make the following assumptions on the functional forms of the inverse demand functions pm(Gm)
and pb(Gb) and on the parameters of the model. Let
pm(Gm(Em)) = 5 ￿ 5(Em=2)1=2
pb(Gb(Eb)) = 6:5 ￿ 2:5(Eb=2)1=2
and
Table 1: Parameters values
Parameter Value
b gm 4
gh
b 2
￿(￿n) 2:5
K 2
￿ 0:7
Lm 1
Lb 3
￿h 2
eh 2
w 0:5
￿ 0:2
￿n 0:5
Note that the values of the parameters are chosen such that the condition ￿ <
(1￿￿)eh
￿
w+eh is
satis￿ed, that is,
(1￿￿)eh
w+eh = 0:3￿2
2:5 = 0:24 > 0:2
Also, note that the condition in Proposition 4 is satis￿ed, since pm(Gm(Em))(b gm ￿ gh
b) =
[5 ￿ 5(x=2)1=2] ￿ 2 > 2:5 = ￿(￿n) for x 2 (0;1): To see this, note that the solution to
[5 ￿ 5(x=2)1=2] ￿ 2 ￿ 2:5 = 0
46is (x = 1:125)
C.2 Computing equilibrium in the Mission Sector
Recall that equilibrium in the mission sector is de￿ned by the following two conditions:
wV = pm(Gm)b gm ￿ ￿(￿n) (C-1)
wV (Em) =
￿
1 ￿ ￿2￿￿
1 + ￿
(1￿￿)Em
Lm￿Em ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿￿
￿
1 + ￿
(1￿￿)Em
Lm￿Em ￿ ￿2
￿ eh +
￿
1 ￿ ￿2￿
￿
1 + ￿
(1￿￿)Em
Lm￿Em ￿ ￿2
￿
￿
w ￿ ￿h (C-2)
Substituting yields
￿
1 ￿ ￿2￿￿
1 + ￿
(1￿￿)Em
Lm￿Em ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿￿
￿
1 + ￿
(1￿￿)Em
Lm￿Em ￿ ￿2
￿ eh +
￿
1 ￿ ￿2￿
￿
1 + ￿
(1￿￿)Em
Lm￿Em ￿ ￿2
￿
￿
w ￿ ￿h + ￿(￿n) ￿ pm(Gm)b gm = 0
(C-3)
Then (C-3) implies that
(1 ￿ 0:72)(1 + 0:70:3Em
1￿Em ￿ 0:7 ￿ (1 ￿ 0:2))
0:7 ￿ 0:2(1 + 0:70:3Em
1￿Em ￿ 0:72)
2+
(1 ￿ 0:72)
(1 + 0:70:3Em
1￿Em ￿ 0:72)
0:5￿2￿(17:5￿20(Em=2)1=2) = 0
This equation has two solutions, we pick the one in the relevant region, that is, for Em 2 (0;1):
The solution is
￿
e Em = 0:771
￿
:
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0
5
10
15
20
Em
Wv
which implies that:
￿m( e Em) = 1:014 while e wV = 5:076
47C.3 Computing equilibrium in the Pro￿t Sector
Recall that the equations that determine the equilibrium are:
pb(Gb)gh
b ￿ wI = K
wI(Eb) =
￿
1 ￿ ￿2￿￿
1 + ￿
(1￿￿)Eb
Lb￿Eb ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿￿
￿
1 + ￿
(1￿￿)Eb
Lb￿Eb ￿ ￿2
￿ eh +
￿
1 ￿ ￿2￿
￿
1 + ￿
(1￿￿)Eb
Lb￿Eb ￿ ￿2
￿
￿
w
Equilibrium point is solution to
(1 ￿ 0:72)(1 + 0:7
0:3Eb
3￿Eb ￿ 0:7 ￿ (1 ￿ 0:2))
0:7 ￿ 0:2(1 + 0:7
0:3Eb
3￿Eb ￿ 0:72)
2 +
(1 ￿ 0:72)
(1 + 0:7
0:3Eb
3￿Eb ￿ 0:72)
0:5 ￿ (11 ￿ 5(Eb=2)1=2) = 0
This equation has two solutions. We pick the one in the relevant region, for Eb 2 (0;3). The
solution is:
n
e Eb = 1:338
o
0 1 2 3
0
5
10
Eb
Wi
which implies that
￿b( e Eb) = 0:241 and e wI = 6:910
C.4 Checking the sorting constraint for Workers
We verify that the sorting conditions of workers hold by computing directly e V
g
u (m); e Vi
g
(b) and
e V
g
i (m). Using the parametric values from the table and the equilibrium values we obtained above
it is
e V g
u (m) =
0:5
1 ￿ 0:7 + 0:7 ￿ 1:014
￿
0:7 ￿ 1:014 ￿ 2
(1 ￿ 0:72)(1 ￿ 0:7 + 0:7 ￿ 1:014)
+
0:72 ￿ 1:014
(1 ￿ 0:72)(1 ￿ 0:7 + 0:7 ￿ 1:014)
(5:076 ￿ 2) = 0:706
48e V
g
i (b) =
0:5
1 ￿ 0:7 + 0:7 ￿ 0:241
￿
0:7 ￿ 0:241 ￿ 2
(1 ￿ 0:72)(1 ￿ 0:7 + 0:7 ￿ 0:241)
+
0:72 ￿ 0:241
(1 ￿ 0:72)(1 ￿ 0:7 + 0:7 ￿ 0:241)
(6:910 ￿ 2) = 2:081 for i 2 fu;m1;m2g
e V
g
i (m) =
0:5
1 ￿ 0:7 + 0:7 ￿ 1:014
￿
0:7 ￿ 1:014 ￿ 2
(1 ￿ 0:72)(1 ￿ 0:7 + 0:7 ￿ 1:014)
+
0:72 ￿ 1:014
(1 ￿ 0:72)(1 ￿ 0:7 + 0:7 ￿ 1:014)
(5:076 + 2 ￿ 2) = 2:636 for i 2 fm1;m2g
Therefore,
e V
g
i (m) > e V
g
i (b) for i 2 fm1;m2g
and
e V g
u (b) > e V g
u (m)
which implies that workers￿sorting constraints are satis￿ed.
C.5 Checking the sorting constraint for Managers
Recall that the sorting condition for managers is
pb(Gb( e Eb))gh
b ￿ wI( e Eb) ￿ b(b gm)
pm(Gm( e Em))b gm ￿ wV ( e Em)
< ￿n <
pb(Gb( e Eb))gh
b ￿ wI( e Eb)
pm(Gm( e Em))b gm ￿ wV ( e Em)
But
pb(Gb( e Eb))gh
b ￿ wI( e Eb) ￿ b(b gm)
pm(Gm( e Em))b gm ￿ wV ( e Em)
=
13 ￿ 5(1:338=2)1=2 ￿ 6:91 ￿ 1
20 ￿ 20(0:771=2)1=2 ￿ 5:076
= 0:4
and
pb(Gb( e Eb))gh
b ￿ wI( e Eb)
pm(Gm( e Em))b gm ￿ wV ( e Em)
=
13 ￿ 5(1:338=2)1=2 ￿ 6:910
15 ￿ 15(0:446=2)1=2 ￿ 4:910
= 0:66
so for ￿n 2 (0:4;0:66) managers￿sorting conditions are met.
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